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      Safe Use and Storage of Cleaners, Disinfectants, and Hand Sanitizers: Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practices among U.S. Adults during the COVID-19 Pandemic, May 2020

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          Abstract.

          Cleaning and disinfection of frequently touched surfaces and frequent hand hygiene are recommended measures to prevent transmission of SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19. Since the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic, poison center calls regarding exposures to cleaners, disinfectants, and hand sanitizers have increased as compared with prior years, indicating a need to evaluate household safety precautions. An opt-in Internet panel survey of 502 U.S. adults was conducted in May 2020. Survey items evaluated knowledge regarding use and storage of cleaners, disinfectants, and hand sanitizers; attitudes about household cleaning and disinfection; and safety precautions practiced during the prior month. We assigned a knowledge score to each respondent to quantify knowledge of safety precautions and calculated median scores by demographic characteristics and attitudes. We identified gaps in knowledge regarding safe use and storage of cleaners, disinfectants, and hand sanitizers; the overall median knowledge score was 5.17 (95% CI: 4.85–5.50; maximum 9.00). Knowledge scores were lower among younger than older age-groups and among black non-Hispanic and Hispanic respondents compared with white non-Hispanic respondents. A greater proportion of respondents expressed knowledge of safety precautions than the proportion who engaged in these precautions. Tailored communication strategies should be used to reach populations with lower knowledge of cleaning and disinfection safety. In addition, as knowledge alone did not shape individual engagement in safety precautions, health promotion campaigns may specifically emphasize the health risks of unsafe use and storage of cleaners, disinfectants, and hand sanitizers to address risk perception.

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            Does tailoring matter? Meta-analytic review of tailored print health behavior change interventions.

            Although there is a large and growing literature on tailored print health behavior change interventions, it is currently not known if or to what extent tailoring works. The current study provides a meta-analytic review of this literature, with a primary focus on the effects of tailoring. A comprehensive search strategy yielded 57 studies that met inclusion criteria. Those studies-which contained a cumulative N = 58,454-were subsequently meta-analyzed. The sample size-weighted mean effect size of the effects of tailoring on health behavior change was found to be r = .074. Variables that were found to significantly moderate the effect included (a) type of comparison condition, (b) health behavior, (c) type of participant population (both type of recruitment and country of sample), (d) type of print material, (e) number of intervention contacts, (f) length of follow-up, (g) number and type of theoretical concepts tailored on, and (h) whether demographics and/or behavior were tailored on. Implications of these results are discussed and future directions for research on tailored health messages and interventions are offered. Copyright 2007 APA
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              Validating the demographic, political, psychological, and experimental results obtained from a new source of online survey respondents

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Am J Trop Med Hyg
                Am J Trop Med Hyg
                tpmd
                tropmed
                The American Journal of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene
                The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene
                0002-9637
                1476-1645
                February 2021
                29 December 2020
                29 December 2020
                : 104
                : 2
                : 496-501
                Affiliations
                [1 ]COVID-19 Response, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia;
                [2 ]National Center for Environmental Health, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia
                Author notes
                [* ]Address correspondence to Radhika Gharpure, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 600 Clifton Rd. NE, Mailstop H24-10, Atlanta, GA 30329. E-mail: rgharpure@ 123456cdc.gov

                Disclaimer: The findings and conclusions in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position of the CDC.

                Authors’ addresses: Radhika Gharpure, Gabrielle F. Miller, Candis M. Hunter, Jasen Kunz, and Amanda G. Garcia-Williams, COVID-19 Response, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, E-mails: rgharpure@ 123456cdc.gov , ygm3@ 123456cdc.gov , hlb8@ 123456cdc.gov , izk0@ 123456cdc.gov , and gvl8@ 123456cdc.gov . Amy H. Schnall, National Center for Environmental Health, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, GA, E-mail: ghu5@ 123456cdc.gov .

                Article
                tpmd201119
                10.4269/ajtmh.20-1119
                7866329
                33377450
                68c3656a-b1f0-41fa-9399-82f2faa6f6d0
                © The American Society of Tropical Medicine and Hygiene

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC-BY) License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.

                History
                : 01 September 2020
                : 18 December 2020
                Page count
                Pages: 6
                Categories
                Articles

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                Infectious disease & Microbiology

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