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      Veto Players and Civil War Duration

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      Journal: American Journal of Political Science
      Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

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          Monitoring Trends in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths

          Bethany Lacina, Nils Gleditsch (2005)
          Article 0 comments Cited 165 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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            What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition

            N. Sambanis (2004)
            Article 0 comments Cited 146 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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              The Consequences of Negotiated Settlements in Civil Wars, 1945–1993

              Roy Licklider (1995)
              We know very little about how civil wars end. Harrison Wagner has argued that negotiated settlements of civil wars are likely to break down because segments of power-sharing governments retain the capacity for resorting to civil war while victory destroys the losers' organization, making it very difficult to resume the war. An analysis of a data set of 91 post-1945 civil wars generally supports this hypothesis but only in wars over identity issues. Moreover, while military victories may be less likely to break down than negotiated settlements of identity civil wars, they are also more likely to be followed by acts of genocide. Outsiders concerned with minimizing violence thus face a dilemma.
              Article 0 comments Cited 140 times – based on 0 reviews     Review now
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Title: American Journal of Political Science
                Abbreviated Title: Am J Political Science
                Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
                ISSN (Print): 0092-5853
                ISSN (Electronic): 1540-5907
                Publication date Created: October 2006
                Publication date (Print): October 2006
                Volume: 50
                Issue: 4
                Pages: 875-892
                Article
                DOI: 10.1111/j.1540-5907.2006.00221.x
                SO-VID: 6fd54b35-116a-4070-81a6-080b48ff3a59
                Copyright © © 2006
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                http://doi.wiley.com/10.1002/tdm_license_1.1

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