In recent decades, many emerging infectious diseases have been occurring at an increasing
scale and frequency—i.e. Ebola virus disease, severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS),
avian and pandemic influenza, Middle-East respiratory syndrome (MERS), and the recently
emerged coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19). The outbreaks of these diseases resulted
in wide ranging socioeconomic consequences, including loss of lives and disruption
to trade and travel. Preparedness is a crucial investment because its cost is small
compared with the unmitigated impact of a health emergency. The financing gap for
preparedness, estimated at US$4·5 billion per year, is miniscule compared with estimated
pandemic costs of $570 billion per year.1, 2
Within urban settings, preparedness activities have the added challenge of navigating
a host of disruptive determinants that demand innovative solutions, especially the
way in which diseases and their human hosts behave.
3
Ensuring that urban settings are prepared for emerging infectious diseases is crucially
important. In 2018, 55% of the world's population (4·2 billion people) resided in
urban areas, and this proportion might increase to 68% by 2050.
4
Emerging infectious diseases also either originate in urban settings, such as the
emergence of COVID-19 in Wuhan, China, or rapidly propagate because of urbanisation
once they are established, such as outbreaks of SARS in 2003 and Zika virus disease
in the Americas.5, 6, 7
Many cities are important hubs of travel and trade; hence an uncontained outbreak
would result in severe economic consequences beyond lives lost. More importantly,
these urban centres risk becoming conduits of transmission to the world. As seen from
the spread of COVID-19, diseases now follow major patterns of travel connections both
domestically (with major cities in China connected by high speed rail) and internationally
through flights.
8
For example, as of Feb 17, 2020, there were 172 exported cases of COVID-19 from China
to 25 countries, with 156 secondary cases in 14 countries, and these were mostly in
major cities with travel connections to China.
9
Urban settings have some common characteristics, many of which are disruptive factors
that need to be addressed for effective preparedness.
3
For example, the density of people in housing, during commutes using public transportation,
and in work environments is high. Inequalities, exacerbated by the rapid influx of
people from rural areas, often results in poor housing, insufficient supply of fresh
water, poor sanitation facilities, and ineffective ventilation systems, all of which
increase outbreak risks. Rapid urbanisation might lead to encroachment into natural
habitats and closer encounters with wildlife and zoonoses, and increased proximity
to animals in backyard farms and food markets also provides opportunities for zoonotic
infections. Both SARS and COVID-19 might have originated from food markets, and of
the 335 emerging infectious diseases recognised between 1940 and 2004, more than 60%
were of zoonotic origin.
10
Ensuring better preparedness in urban settings will require a fresh emphasis on strengthening
capacities to deal with outbreaks and other health emergencies. Many of these efforts
are applicable across all settings, urban or otherwise, such as having a good understanding
of the local socioeconomic and cultural milieu and an active involvement of communities
and local leaders in both planning and implementation. However, urban settings also
offer new opportunities (table
), such as securing the commitment of local leaders and strengthening public health
networks to prevent, detect, and respond to disease threats early. Businesses can
be appropriately engaged to manage employees in an emergency, and risk communication
can be pushed through prevalent social media networks. Many lessons will also be learned
from the city-wide community containment measures in Wuhan—the largest community quarantine
exercise in history—and other containment measures rolled out in other Chinese cities
and in Singapore.
Table
Challenges, and opportunities for epidemic preparedness associated with characteristics
of urban settings
Challenges
Opportunities
High population density and high volume of public transportation
A larger population to be managed; ease of disease spread between humans in congested
areas; difficulties in contact tracing, especially causal contact in public areas;
inequalities resulting in poor housing environments that might hinder outbreak prevention
and control efforts; closer encounters with wildlife via food markets or because of
expansion into previously untouched ecosystems
Urban planners can consider epidemic preparedness in their designs and implementation;
transport networks can be used to rapidly move supplies to outbreak epicentres; harnessing
advancement in technologies for more effective contact tracing
Interface between animals and humans
Areas of poor sanitation with rodents and other animal vectors; live domestic and
wild animal markets; animals raised in backyard farms or industrial agricultural facilities
in close proximity to humans
Improved sanitation and rodent control around humans and animal communities; vaccination
of domestic animals for common zoonotic infections; precautions at slaughter to prevent
contact with blood; regulating live animal markets to phase out sale of live animals
or to ensure that those for sale are raised on commercial farms and have been verified
to be disease free
Governance by local authorities
Competing interests within a finite local budget; insufficient authority to institute
response measures promptly; insufficient epidemic preparedness capabilities or capacities
at a subnational and local level; difficulties in accessing national capacities
Leaders in cities would be better placed to develop and implement effective and contextually
appropriate solutions; consolidated local surveillance data can improve sense-making
at the national level; local leaders can be engaged to advocate for greater investments
in local systems
Heterogeneous subpopulations
A wide range of cultural factors, including modes of social interactions and acceptable
control measures; some subpopulations might be difficult to reach
Community leaders can be mobilised for targeted approaches to preparedness and response;
innovative solutions can be shared and adapted across cultures
High connectivity to other urban centres (domestic and international)
High likelihood of multiple importation events; risk of rapid export of disease to
other parts of the country or to other countries; fear might lead to restrictions
on travel and trade
Evidence-based points of entry measures and exit screening measures can be implemented;
trust can be built through strong diplomatic relations to allow for better collaboration
Centres of commerce
Greater disruption to economic activity, stability, and growth
Businesses and corporations can be engaged in business continuity plans that also
prevent further spread, as part of a whole-of-society approach
Unconventional communications and interactions
Multiple information sources leading to misinformation; false information might spread
quickly
Unconventional but reliable information channels and social media can be used for
risk communication
Many urban settings now have substantial expertise and experience in preparing for
and dealing with health emergencies. Having had large outbreaks of infectious diseases,
authorities in some urban areas have developed purpose-built surveillance systems
that make use of digital and web-based information.
11
Other local authorities have established surge capacity and contingency plans, including
strong links with health-care facilities and national coordination bodies.
12
In some urban settings, complex simulation exercises have been run and disease spread
has been modelled to determine the most effective public health actions to control
the spread of infectious diseases.
13
There is room for sharing of best practices and measures in urban settings. Having
an assessment and evaluation tool that is tailored for urban settings might also be
useful for preparedness planning.
The ongoing pandemic of COVID-19 is a strong reminder that urbanisation has changed
the way that people and communities live, work, and interact, and the need to strengthen
systems and local capacities to prevent the spread of infectious diseases is urgent.
As a global community, we must collectively invest in and build strong preparedness
systems that are better adapted to increasingly urbanised settings.