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      Chimpanzees Are Rational Maximizers in an Ultimatum Game

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      Science
      American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)

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          Abstract

          Traditional models of economic decision-making assume that people are self-interested rational maximizers. Empirical research has demonstrated, however, that people will take into account the interests of others and are sensitive to norms of cooperation and fairness. In one of the most robust tests of this finding, the ultimatum game, individuals will reject a proposed division of a monetary windfall, at a cost to themselves, if they perceive it as unfair. Here we show that in an ultimatum game, humans' closest living relatives, chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes), are rational maximizers and are not sensitive to fairness. These results support the hypothesis that other-regarding preferences and aversion to inequitable outcomes, which play key roles in human social organization, distinguish us from our closest living relatives.

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Science
                Science
                American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS)
                0036-8075
                1095-9203
                October 05 2007
                October 05 2007
                October 05 2007
                October 05 2007
                : 318
                : 5847
                : 107-109
                Article
                10.1126/science.1145850
                17916736
                9eb32886-6984-4ff7-bd28-2379d38e39a7
                © 2007
                History

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