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      Does payment for performance increase performance inequalities across health providers? A case study of Tanzania

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          Abstract

          The impact of payment-for-performance (P4P) schemes in the health sector has been documented, but there has been little attention to the distributional effects of P4P across health facilities. We examined the distribution of P4P payouts over time and assessed whether increased service coverage due to P4P differed across facilities in Tanzania. We used two service outcomes that improved due to P4P [facility-based deliveries and provision of antimalarials during antenatal care (ANC)], to also assess whether incentive design matters for performance inequalities. We used data from 150 facilities from intervention and comparison areas in January 2012 and 13 months later. Our primary data were gathered through facility survey and household survey, while data on performance payouts were obtained from the programme administrator. Descriptive inequality measures were used to examine the distribution of payouts across facility subgroups. Difference-in-differences regression analyses were used to identify P4P differential effects on the two service coverage outcomes across facility subgroups. We found that performance payouts were initially higher among higher-level facilities (hospitals and health centres) compared with dispensaries, among facilities with more medical commodities and among facilities serving wealthier populations, but these inequalities declined over time. P4P had greater effects on coverage of institutional deliveries among facilities with low baseline performance, serving middle wealth populations and located in rural areas. P4P effects on antimalarials provision during ANC was similar across facilities. Performance inequalities were influenced by the design of incentives and a range of facility characteristics; however, the nature of the service being targeted is also likely to have affected provider response. Further research is needed to examine in more detail the effects of incentive design on outcomes and researchers should be encouraged to report on design aspects in their evaluations of P4P and systematically monitor and report subgroup effects across providers.

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          Most cited references32

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          Explaining trends in inequities: evidence from Brazilian child health studies.

          There is considerable international concern that child-health inequities seem to be getting worse between and within richer and poorer countries. The "inverse equity hypothesis" is proposed to explain how such health inequities may get worse, remain the same, or improve over time. We postulate that as new public-health interventions and programmes initially reach those of higher socioeconomic status and only later affect the poor, there are early increases in inequity ratios for coverage, morbidity, and mortality indicators. Inequities only improve later when the rich have achieved new minimum achievable levels for morbidity and mortality and the poor gain greater access to the interventions. The hypothesis was examined using three epidemiological data sets for time trends in child-health inequities within Brazil. Time trends for inequity ratios for morbidity and mortality, which were consistent with the hypothesis, showed both improvements and deterioration over time, despite the indicators showing absolute improvements in health status between rich and poor.
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            Public reporting and pay for performance in hospital quality improvement.

            Public reporting and pay for performance are intended to accelerate improvements in hospital care, yet little is known about the benefits of these methods of providing incentives for improving care. We measured changes in adherence to 10 individual and 4 composite measures of quality over a period of 2 years at 613 hospitals that voluntarily reported information about the quality of care through a national public-reporting initiative, including 207 facilities that simultaneously participated in a pay-for-performance demonstration project funded by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; we then compared the pay-for-performance hospitals with the 406 hospitals with public reporting only (control hospitals). We used multivariable modeling to estimate the improvement attributable to financial incentives after adjusting for baseline performance and other hospital characteristics. As compared with the control group, pay-for-performance hospitals showed greater improvement in all composite measures of quality, including measures of care for heart failure, acute myocardial infarction, and pneumonia and a composite of 10 measures. Baseline performance was inversely associated with improvement; in pay-for-performance hospitals, the improvement in the composite of all 10 measures was 16.1% for hospitals in the lowest quintile of baseline performance and 1.9% for those in the highest quintile (P<0.001). After adjustments were made for differences in baseline performance and other hospital characteristics, pay for performance was associated with improvements ranging from 2.6 to 4.1% over the 2-year period. Hospitals engaged in both public reporting and pay for performance achieved modestly greater improvements in quality than did hospitals engaged only in public reporting. Additional research is required to determine whether different incentives would stimulate more improvement and whether the benefits of these programs outweigh their costs. 2007 Massachusetts Medical Society
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              Goals as reference points.

              We argue that goals serve as reference points and alter outcomes in a manner consistent with the value function of Prospect Theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). We present new evidence that goals inherit the properties of the value function-not only a reference point, but also loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity. We also use the value function to explain previous empirical results in the goal literature on affect, effort, persistence, and performance. Copyright 1999 Academic Press.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Health Policy Plan
                Health Policy Plan
                heapol
                Health Policy and Planning
                Oxford University Press
                0268-1080
                1460-2237
                November 2018
                31 October 2018
                31 October 2018
                : 33
                : 9
                : 1026-1036
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Centre for International Health, University of Bergen, Bergen, Norway
                [2 ]Department of Health System, Impact Evaluation, and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
                [3 ]Department of Global Health and Development, Chr. Michelsen Institute, Bergen, Norway
                [4 ]Department of Economics, University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
                [5 ]Department of Global Health and Development, London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine, 15-17 Tavistock Place, London, UK
                Author notes
                Corresponding author. Department of Health System, Impact Evaluation, and Policy, Ifakara Health Institute, PO Box 78373, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. E-mail: pbinyaruka@ 123456ihi.or.tz
                Article
                czy084
                10.1093/heapol/czy084
                6263023
                30380062
                b908ddbf-253c-4f0f-ae5a-694d8ed0e88f
                © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press in association with The London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.

                This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

                History
                : 27 September 2018
                Page count
                Pages: 11
                Funding
                Funded by: Government of Norway
                Award ID: TAN-3108
                Award ID: TAN 13/0005
                Funded by: UK Department for International Development
                Funded by: DFID 10.13039/501100000278
                Funded by: Consortium for Research on Resilient and Responsive Health Systems
                Funded by: RESYST
                Funded by: University of Bergen for Peter Binyaruka
                Funded by: Norwegian State Education Loan Fund
                Categories
                Original Articles

                Social policy & Welfare
                payment-for-performance,inequality,impact evaluation,incentive design,tanzania

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