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      The menacing assaults on science, FDA, CDC, and health of the US public

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          Abstract

          While health authorities sounded early warnings concerning COVID-19 [1], the United States (US) government practised “pandemic politics” and escalated menacing assaults on science, including repeated denials of epidemic principles of mitigation and containment. The first on December 31, 2019 was that the virus would not enter the US. A second on January 20, 2020 following introduction of the first US case from Wuhan, China was that “the virus would not spread.” A third on February 26 was that the 15 cases would “go away” when temperatures climbed [2]. A fourth is continued and repeated denials of clear benefits of masking [3]. On April 27, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued an Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for hydroxychloroquine without randomized evidence [4,5]. The drug was approved 47 years ago primarily for young women with autoimmune diseases but there were no reliable randomized data about COVID-19 patients, many at risk of fatal arrhythmias, formulated from uncontrolled clinical observations [6]. Shortly thereafter, the trials all showed no benefit and some demonstrated harm. On June 15, the FDA withdrew the EUA but the US President continued to embrace the prescription of hydroxychloroquine which increased nine-fold, rendering the drug unavailable for many patients with autoimmune diseases. On August 24, the FDA again issued an EUA for convalescent plasma without any reliable data from large-scale randomized trials [4,5] but only one small trial, not surprisingly, showing no benefit [7]. Even more disturbing is the escalation of the politicisation of the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), formerly a role model for disease control and prevention activities worldwide. During COVID-19 the CDC issued reopening guidelines after initial lockdowns that lasted only until the epidemic curve flattened, violating their own principles to continue until cases and deaths drastically fell. On August 25, the CDC apparently updated guidelines excluding exposed but asymptomatic individuals from testing. Then, on September 17, it was revealed that White House officials edited the published guidelines without CDC approval. Thus, public trust and their longstanding stellar reputation need to be revived [8]. The government's menacing assaults on science have led to the US suffering >203 thousand deaths compared with <3 thousand in South Korea after inflation for the six-fold difference in populations. Whilst the first cases were introduced on the same date in both countries. South Korea mounted an immediate and nationally coordinated effort to mitigate and contain COVID-19. In contrast, US responses were delayed, fragmented, and failed to emphasise masking, social distancing, and crowd avoidance. One tragic consequence is that the US is and will remain the epicentre of the pandemic accounting for >20% of global cases and deaths with <5% of the population [3]. If the past is prologue then pandemic politics concerning vaccines will lead to another premature EUA. In vaccine development, efficacy requires reliable data from randomised trials of a few thousand subjects over months. Safety, however, requires far larger sample sizes over a year or more [10]. In 1976, a swine flu vaccine was rushed to production and distribution and caused Guillain-Barre syndrome. Unfortunately, hopes and expectations of the US public have already been raised by unsubstantiated pronouncements [4,5]. Public health strategies of proven benefit may confer at least similar benefits to any vaccine [3]. Nonetheless, the US Attorney General has proclaimed lockdowns as tantamount to “house arrests” and the “greatest intrusion on civil liberties since slavery.” In addition, the menacing assaults on science decrease the ability to obtain the necessary reliable randomised evidence. Trust will continue to be eroded in other vaccines, as well as the FDA and CDC, leading to even more avoidable US deaths. In 2013 the Melinda and Bill Gates Foundation predicted a pandemic, most likely from coronavirus. In 2015, the US established a Global Health Security and Biodefense Unit. In 2016 the US was judged the best equipped country worldwide to contain and mitigate any pandemic. In 2018, however, the US government disbanded the entire team. Thus, the country judged best prepared for the existential threat was least prepared for the actual threat. The continued menacing assaults on science threaten to turn the present tragedy into a future nightmare. Deaths may become more than ten-fold greater than the 61,000 US fatalities from influenza in 2018–2019 and comparable to the 675,000 American deaths from the Spanish flu in 1918–1919 [3]. One of the most consequential US presidential elections will occur November 3. The President recently proffered “herd mentality” to combat COVID-19 which would result in from two to six million avoidable deaths depending upon the timing and availability of an effective and safe vaccine applied to the majority of US citizens. The President has referred to the election as a referendum on himself but, in some senses, it is a referendum on science and democracy. This is due, in part, to the fact that, whilst publicly issuing repeated denials in February, he privately stated that COVID-19 “was more deadly than even your strenuous flus.” In stark contrast to causing premature deaths, as competent and compassionate healthcare professionals, we must redouble efforts to combat pandemic politics and promote evidence-based clinical practices and discovery research. In the face of continued menacing assaults on science, healthcare providers should recall the Hippocratic Oath of “primum non nocere” and collaborate to enhance the health of the public throughout the world. As inscribed on the Richard Doll Building at the University of Oxford, “Death in old age is inevitable, but death before old age is not,” [9] —especially from COVID-19. Declaration of Competing Interest Dr. Alter, Professor Maki, Dr. LeBlang, and Professor Shih have no declarations of interest. Professor Hennekens reports grants, personal fees and non-financial support; he declares that he serves as an independent scientist in an advisory role to investigators and sponsors as Chair of data monitoring committees for Amgen, British Heart Foundation, Cadila, Canadian Institutes of Health Research, DalCor, Novartis, Regeneron and UCB; to the Collaborative Institutional Training Initiative (CITI), legal counsel for Pfizer, the United States Food and Drug Administration, and UpToDate; receives royalties for authorship or editorship of 3 textbooks and as co-inventor on patents for inflammatory markers and cardiovascular disease that are held by Brigham and Women's Hospital; has an investment management relationship with the West-Bacon Group within SunTrust Investment Services, which has discretionary investment authority; does not own any common or preferred stock in any pharmaceutical or medical device company; all outside the submitted work.

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          Most cited references10

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          Effect of Convalescent Plasma Therapy on Time to Clinical Improvement in Patients With Severe and Life-threatening COVID-19: A Randomized Clinical Trial

          Convalescent plasma is a potential therapeutic option for patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), but further data from randomized clinical trials are needed.
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            COVID-19: too little, too late?

            The Lancet (2020)
            Although WHO has yet to call the outbreak of SARS-CoV-2 infection a pandemic, it has confirmed that the virus is likely to spread to most, if not all, countries. Regardless of terminology, this latest coronavirus epidemic is now seeing larger increases in cases outside China. As of March 3, more than 90 000 confirmed cases of COVID-19 have been reported in 73 countries. The outbreak in northern Italy, which has seen 11 towns officially locked down and residents threatened with imprisonment if they try to leave, shocked European political leaders. Their shock turned to horror as they saw Italy become the epicentre for further spread across the continent. As the window for global containment closes, health ministers are scrambling to implement appropriate measures to delay spread of the virus. But their actions have been slow and insufficient. There is now a real danger that countries have done too little, too late to contain the epidemic. By striking contrast, the WHO-China joint mission report calls China's vigorous public health measures toward this new coronavirus probably the most “ambitious, agile and aggressive disease containment effort in history”. China seems to have avoided a substantial number of cases and fatalities, although there have been severe effects on the nation's economy. In its report on the joint mission, WHO recommends that countries activate the highest level of national response management protocols to ensure the all-of-government and all-of-society approaches needed to contain viral spread. China's success rests largely with a strong administrative system that it can mobilise in times of threat, combined with the ready agreement of the Chinese people to obey stringent public health procedures. Although other nations lack China's command-and-control political economy, there are important lessons that presidents and prime ministers can learn from China's experience. The signs are that those lessons have not been learned. SARS-CoV-2 presents different challenges to high-income and low-income or middle-income countries (LMICs). A major fear over global spread is how weak health systems will cope. Some countries, such as Nigeria, have so far successfully dealt with individual cases. But large outbreaks could easily overwhelm LMIC health services. The difficult truth is that countries in most of sub-Saharan Africa, for example, are not prepared for an epidemic of coronavirus. And nor are many nations across Latin America and the Middle East. Public health measures, such as surveillance, exhaustive contact tracing, social distancing, travel restrictions, educating the public on hand hygiene, ensuring flu vaccinations for the frail and immunocompromised, and postponing non-essential operations and services will all play their part in delaying the spread of infection and dispersing pressure on hospitals. Individual governments will need to decide where they draw the line on implementing these measures. They will have to weigh the ethical, social, and economic risks versus proven health benefits. The evidence surely indicates that political leaders should be moving faster and more aggressively. As Xiaobo Yang and colleagues have shown, the mortality of critically ill patients with SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia is substantial. As they wrote recently in The Lancet Respiratory Medicine, “The severity of SARS-CoV-2 pneumonia poses great strain on critical care resources in hospitals, especially if they are not adequately staffed or resourced.” This coronavirus is not benign. It kills. The political response to the epidemic should therefore reflect the national security threat that SARS-CoV-2 represents. National governments have all released guidance for health-care professionals, but published advice alone is insufficient. Guidance on how to manage patients with COVID-19 must be delivered urgently to health-care workers in the form of workshops, online teaching, smart phone engagement, and peer-to-peer education. Equipment such as personal protective equipment, ventilators, oxygen, and testing kits must be made available and supply chains strengthened. The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control recommends that hospitals set up a core team including hospital management, an infection control team member, an infectious disease expert, and specialists representing the intensive care unit and accident and emergency departments. So far, evidence suggests that the colossal public health efforts of the Chinese Government have saved thousands of lives. High-income countries, now facing their own outbreaks, must take reasoned risks and act more decisively. They must abandon their fears of the negative short-term public and economic consequences that may follow from restricting public freedoms as part of more assertive infection control measures. © 2020 Manuel Silvestri/Reuters Picutres 2020 Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.
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              COVID-19 vaccine trials should seek worthwhile efficacy

              Three issues are crucial in planning COVID-19 vaccine trials: (1) whether to demand not only proof of some vaccine efficacy but also proof of worthwhile efficacy; (2) whether the initial trials of vaccine against placebo should prioritise not only single-vaccine trials but also a multivaccine trial; and (3) whether to assess safety, protection against severe disease, and duration of protection by continuing blinded follow-up of the vaccine and placebo groups after definite evidence of short-term efficacy has emerged, but before an effective vaccine has been deployed locally in the general population. The world needs efficient, speedy, and reliable evaluation of many candidate vaccines against COVID-19. There is a danger that political and economic pressures for rapid introduction of a COVID-19 vaccine could lead to widespread deployment of a vaccine that is in reality only weakly effective (eg, reducing COVID-19 incidence by only 10–20%), perhaps because of a misleadingly promising result from an underpowered trial. Deployment of a weakly effective vaccine could actually worsen the COVID-19 pandemic if authorities wrongly assume it causes a substantial reduction in risk, or if vaccinated individuals wrongly believe they are immune, hence reducing implementation of, or compliance with, other COVID-19 control measures. Deployment of a marginally effective vaccine could also interfere with the evaluation of other vaccines, as subsequent vaccines would then have to be compared with it rather than with a placebo. For a vaccine superior to the weakly effective vaccine, the increased sample size required could delay recognition of its efficacy. More importantly, if the weak vaccine is compared against an even weaker vaccine, the statistical criteria used to analyse non-inferiority trials could well endorse the even weaker vaccine as being non-inferior (so-called bio-creep). 1 The criteria used to define a successful vaccine in the initial clinical trials of vaccination versus placebo should therefore be strict enough to protect against the risk of a weakly effective vaccine being deployed, especially since there are already many candidate vaccines against COVID-19 to be tested, 2 providing many chances to overestimate efficacy. Hence, the initial trials comparing COVID-19 vaccines versus placebo should seek reliable evidence not only of some efficacy but of worthwhile efficacy. WHO recommends that successful vaccines should show an estimated risk reduction of at least one-half, 3 with sufficient precision to conclude that the true vaccine efficacy is greater than 30%. This means that the 95% CI for the trial result should exclude efficacy less than 30%. Current US Food and Drug Administration guidance includes this lower limit of 30% as a criterion for vaccine licensure. 4 As an example of a result that would just satisfy these two criteria, an evenly randomised trial with 50 cases arising in those vaccinated and 100 cases arising in those given placebo would have a 95% CI that just excludes 30%, but would suggest 50% short-term efficacy. A vaccine that has 50% efficacy could appreciably reduce incidence of COVID-19 in vaccinated individuals, and might provide useful herd immunity. Hence, although efficacy far greater than 50% would be better, efficacy of about 50% would represent substantial progress. In comparison with individual trials for each of the many different vaccines, a global multivaccine trial with a shared control group could provide more rapid and reliable results. Additionally, its continuous use of established clinical trial infrastructure could save time and effort, accelerating the needed discovery of several safe and effective vaccines. High enrolment rates facilitated by flexible trial design and hundreds of study sites in high-incidence locations could yield results on short-term efficacy for each vaccine within just a few months of including that vaccine. Reliable evidence is also needed about longer-term efficacy, vaccine safety, and protection against severe COVID-19. Trials of sufficient size and duration are needed to provide this, and to determine whether the vaccine can make COVID-19 more hazardous (so-called disease enhancement).5, 6 Trials that assess only immunological endpoints cannot provide this evidence, and human challenge studies in young, otherwise healthy, adult volunteers might not provide sufficient evidence of safety or efficacy in other populations. Assessments of safety in multivaccine trials can determine directly whether particular vaccines have adverse effects not shared by other vaccines. Evaluation of multiple COVID-19 vaccines with standardised methodology will facilitate regulatory and deployment decisions. 7 Unless such decisions are informed by reliable randomised evidence, the effect on public acceptance of COVID-19 vaccines could adversely affect COVID-19 control and the uptake of vaccines against other diseases. 8 The WHO Solidarity Vaccines Trial 9 (figure ) aims to evaluate efficiently and rapidly (within 3–6 months of each vaccine's introduction into the study) the efficacy of multiple vaccines, 10 helping to ensure that weakly effective vaccines are not deployed. The trial seeks to achieve rapid, reliable results by the simplicity of the trial design plus real-time checks on the quality of the limited amount of data sought, facilitating high recruitment rates. A major challenge with vaccine trials at fixed study sites is that unexpectedly low attack rates can delay progress. The WHO trial will mitigate this by geographical diversity, recruiting in many high-incidence countries through fixed and mobile (pop-up) research sites in localities where there are substantial COVID-19 attack rates at the time of enrolment. Figure Selected design features of the WHO Solidarity Vaccines Trial The primary outcome is laboratory-confirmed symptoms >14 days after vaccination is completed. Analyses of each vaccine after about 40, 70, and 100 primary outcomes occur in the placebo group will report success if they show ≤10 versus 40, ≤30 versus 70, or ≤50 versus 100 outcomes. The third analysis is reported regardless of its findings. In all cases placebo-controlled follow-up continues until at least month 12 (or local deployment of an effective vaccine) to assess safety, disease severity, and duration of protection. For a one-dose or two-dose vaccine that halves risk the main result on short-term efficacy should emerge within 3–6 months, unless definite results for a highly effective vaccine emerge in interim analyses. Placebo-controlled follow-up then continues until at least month 12, or until an effective vaccine is deployed locally. This approach increases the reliability of the evidence on younger and older adults, duration of protection, efficacy against severe disease, and any disease enhancement. Funders, vaccine developers, researchers, and government institutions 11 have signed an international statement of collaboration in vaccine research. Several of these developers and more than 250 research sites intend to join the WHO Solidarity Vaccines Trial in the hope of bringing forward the time when the world will move beyond the widespread disease, death, and disruption from the COVID-19 pandemic. The trial costs will be a fraction of the societal costs of COVID-19, and this global collaboration could rebut detrimental vaccine nihilism and vaccine nationalism.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                EClinicalMedicine
                EClinicalMedicine
                EClinicalMedicine
                The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd.
                2589-5370
                10 October 2020
                10 October 2020
                : 100581
                Affiliations
                [a ]Florida Atlantic University Charles E. Schmidt College of Medicine, 777 Glades Road, BC-71, Boca Raton, FL 33431, United States
                [b ]University of Wisconsin School of Medicine & Public Health, 1685 Highland Avenue, Madison, WI 53705, United States
                Author notes
                [* ]Corresponding author.
                Article
                S2589-5370(20)30325-4 100581
                10.1016/j.eclinm.2020.100581
                7546999
                bd37998d-fb74-4464-814b-4ade4a91d988
                © 2020 The Author(s)

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

                History
                : 15 September 2020
                : 21 September 2020
                : 21 September 2020
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