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      Mentalizing and the Role of the Posterior Superior Temporal Sulcus in Sharing Others' Embarrassment

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          Abstract

          The experience of embarrassment provides a highly salient cue for the human moral apparatus. Interestingly, people also experience embarrassment on behalf of others' inappropriate conditions. The perceiver's embarrassment often lacks an equivalent expression of embarrassment in the social counterpart. The present study examines this phenomenon and distinguishes neural circuits involved in embarrassment with and embarrassment for another person's mishaps. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we show that the embarrassment on behalf of others engages the temporal pole and the medial prefrontal cortex, central structures of the mentalizing network, together with the anterior insula and anterior cingulate cortex. In contrast, sharing others' embarrassment additionally stimulated the posterior superior temporal sulcus (STS), which exhibited increased functional integration with inferior parietal and insular cortex areas. These findings characterize common neural circuits involved in the embodied representation of embarrassment and further unravel the unique role of the posterior STS in sharing others' affective state.

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          Most cited references49

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          Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

          Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.
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            Does rejection hurt? An FMRI study of social exclusion.

            A neuroimaging study examined the neural correlates of social exclusion and tested the hypothesis that the brain bases of social pain are similar to those of physical pain. Participants were scanned while playing a virtual ball-tossing game in which they were ultimately excluded. Paralleling results from physical pain studies, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) was more active during exclusion than during inclusion and correlated positively with self-reported distress. Right ventral prefrontal cortex (RVPFC) was active during exclusion and correlated negatively with self-reported distress. ACC changes mediated the RVPFC-distress correlation, suggesting that RVPFC regulates the distress of social exclusion by disrupting ACC activity.
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              Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body.

              Converging evidence indicates that primates have a distinct cortical image of homeostatic afferent activity that reflects all aspects of the physiological condition of all tissues of the body. This interoceptive system, associated with autonomic motor control, is distinct from the exteroceptive system (cutaneous mechanoreception and proprioception) that guides somatic motor activity. The primary interoceptive representation in the dorsal posterior insula engenders distinct highly resolved feelings from the body that include pain, temperature, itch, sensual touch, muscular and visceral sensations, vasomotor activity, hunger, thirst, and 'air hunger'. In humans, a meta-representation of the primary interoceptive activity is engendered in the right anterior insula, which seems to provide the basis for the subjective image of the material self as a feeling (sentient) entity, that is, emotional awareness.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Cerebral Cortex
                Cereb. Cortex
                Oxford University Press (OUP)
                1047-3211
                1460-2199
                July 07 2015
                August 10 2015
                : 25
                : 8
                : 2065-2075
                Article
                10.1093/cercor/bhu011
                24518753
                f62c46bc-75a8-46ad-b20f-8a8cc9eb972c
                © 2015
                History

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