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      Aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2: The unresolved paradox

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          Abstract

          Dear Editor The severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the aetiological agent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has led to a global pandemic defying the geographical borders and putting the lives of billions at risk. The commonly evident symptoms include fever, altered sense of smell and/or taste, cough, sputum expectoration, sore throat, dyspnoea, fatigue and myalgia; whereas the uncommon symptoms include confusion, dizziness, headache, conjunctivitis, rhinorrhoea, nasal congestion, hemoptysis, chest pain, bronchial breath sounds, tachypnoea, crackles/rales on auscultation, cutaneous manifestations, cyanosis, and gastrointestinal symptoms. Throughout the world, mitigation strategies have lingered on the adoption of social distancing, face masks, hand hygiene and environmental disinfection. However, these precautionary measures are still not completely reliable until the modes of transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 remain unraveled. The transmission of respiratory pathogens have been associated with three primary modes known as “contact,” “droplet,” and “airborne” transmission. These modes are also being speculated in the context of SARS-CoV-2, but the existing research-based literature and the consequent guidance from the leading public health agencies are still paradoxical. The contact transmission can occur directly by physical touch or indirectly via fomites containing settled droplets. The droplet transmission involves large droplets more than 20 μm in diameter resulting from a violent expiratory event and deposited upon the conjunctiva or mucus membranes of a susceptible host directly [1] apart from being captured by inspiratory air flows and deposited along the respiratory tract. The airborne or aerosol transmission occurs via small respiratory droplets or droplet nuclei, less than 10 μm in diameter, which remains airborne for sufficient time to transmit the pathogen and may get deposited deep into the respiratory tract, including alveolar region [1]. For the distinction of the transmission modes, droplet sizes need to be carefully interpreted; however, the propositions on the size-related terms are also paradoxical. An example of dichotomy is the postulation from the World Health Organization that respiratory droplets are more than 5 to 10 μm in diameter, whereas droplet nuclei are less than 5 μm in diameter. However, it is also being speculated that the particles of various sizes but indistinct behavior are produced in continuum during the respiratory activities of the infected person and particles as large as 50 μm can also remain airborne and travel the considerable distance as per the factors including force and volume of exhalation, airflow, temperature and humidity [2]. Although the contact and droplet routes are still being advocated as the main modes by leading public health agencies, including WHO, the airborne transmission had been recognized only for aerosol-generating procedures within the healthcare settings. But considering the emerging evidence of the presence of viable SARS-CoV-2 even in the absence of aerosol-generating procedures, the airborne transmission should also be recognized as an important mode of transmission of the SARS-CoV-2 [3]. Furthermore, it should not be neglected that the aerosols are generated even from activities such as exhalation, coughing, sneezing and talking by the infected individuals [2]. The indoor, as well as outdoor airborne transmission, have been elucidated by various empirical and laboratory studies conducted in countries including China, Italy, Singapore and USA [4]. The median estimates of the half-lives of the SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV in aerosols are almost the same i.e. approximately 1.1–1.2 hours (3 hours viability), indicating that both viruses have similar stability characteristics for the plausible aerosol transmission and superspreading [5]. This time is enough for the exposure, inhalation and infection by the virus, which may occur near or far from the actual source, even beyond 1 to 2 m from an infected individual [6]. Recently, even the timeline of 16 hours has been reported for the virus to retain infectivity in laboratory-created aerosols [6]. Considering the airborne transmission, precautions such as hand washing and social distancing are appropriate but insufficient. As the viable SARS-CoV-2 has been isolated in air samples even 2 to 4.8 m away from the source, social distancing by currently recommended parameters of 6 feet would not be effective, especially in an indoor setting [3]. Additional mitigation measures should include the provision of effective ventilation, local exhausts, high-efficiency air filtration, germicidal ultraviolet light, avoidance of overcrowding in public places [6], toilet flushing with a closed lid, minimal use of central air conditioner, universal use of proper facial masks (N95 respirators or surgical or cloth masks as per the availability) fitting tightly to the face apart from proper personal protective equipment (PPE) including the N95 particle protective mask in the laboratory and healthcare settings [4] (Figure 1 ). From the scientific community throughout the globe, there is an urgent and critical requirement of the research to unravel the paradox of SARS-CoV-2 transmission and infectivity so that effective mitigation measures can be outlined. Whereas, the policymakers and leading public health agencies need to upgrade the precautionary approach to interrupt all the plausible modes of transmission until this uncertainty is deciphered. Figure 1 Primary control measures to mitigate the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 as per the consideration of aerosol transmission. Figure 1 CRediT authorship contribution statement Priyanka: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing. Om Prakash Choudhary: Conceptualization, Writing - review & editing. Indraj Singh: Writing - review & editing. Gautam Patra: Writing - review & editing. Declaration of Competing Interest We declare that we have no competing interests.

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          Most cited references6

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            It is Time to Address Airborne Transmission of COVID-19

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              Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2? Evidence, Prevention and Control

              Highlights • There is growing evidence that in addition to contact and drople spread, the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 via aerosols is plausible under favorable conditions. • The aim of this review was to synthesize the evidence for aerosol transmission of COVID-19 and highlight the localities and vulnerable populations where SARS-CoV-2 aerosols may be particularly pertinent to COVID-19 transmission. • Based on the synthesis of evidence, we summarized precautions and infection control strategies to mitigate the possible aerosol transmission of SARS-CoV-2, so as to shed light on the scientific countermeasures for combatting against COVID-19 globally.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Travel Med Infect Dis
                Travel Med Infect Dis
                Travel Medicine and Infectious Disease
                Elsevier Ltd.
                1477-8939
                1873-0442
                4 September 2020
                4 September 2020
                : 101869
                Affiliations
                [1]Department of Veterinary Microbiology, College of Veterinary Sciences and Animal Husbandry, Central Agricultural University (I), Jalukie, Peren, 797110, Nagaland, India
                [2]Department of Veterinary Anatomy and Histology, College of Veterinary Sciences and Animal Husbandry, Central Agricultural University (I), Selesih, Aizawl, 796015, Mizoram, India
                [3]Medical Superintendent, Community Health Centre, Deoband, Saharanpur, 247554, Uttar Pradesh, India
                [4]Department of Veterinary Parasitology, College of Veterinary Sciences and Animal Husbandry, Central Agricultural University (I), Selesih, Aizawl, 796015, Mizoram, India
                Author notes
                []Corresponding author. . Department of Veterinary Anatomy and Histology, College of Veterinary Sciences and Animal Husbandry, Central Agricultural University (I), Selesih, Aizawl, 796015, Mizoram, India
                Article
                S1477-8939(20)30365-3 101869
                10.1016/j.tmaid.2020.101869
                7471761
                32891726
                fe3b444c-3225-458e-a57c-0a819722aac9
                © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

                Since January 2020 Elsevier has created a COVID-19 resource centre with free information in English and Mandarin on the novel coronavirus COVID-19. The COVID-19 resource centre is hosted on Elsevier Connect, the company's public news and information website. Elsevier hereby grants permission to make all its COVID-19-related research that is available on the COVID-19 resource centre - including this research content - immediately available in PubMed Central and other publicly funded repositories, such as the WHO COVID database with rights for unrestricted research re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for free by Elsevier for as long as the COVID-19 resource centre remains active.

                History
                : 16 August 2020
                : 26 August 2020
                : 27 August 2020
                Categories
                Article

                Infectious disease & Microbiology
                Infectious disease & Microbiology

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