Zimbabwe's 2018 elections: funding, public resources and vote buying

SUMMARY

Using the concept of ‘competitive authoritarianism’, this briefing examines how the governing Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) retained power in the July 2018 presidential, parliamentary and local government elections. It advances that, having come to power through military assistance in November 2017, the new ZANU–PF government instituted cosmetic political reforms to gain domestic and international legitimacy while maintaining financial networks and tentacles on public institutions. This briefing posits that, with a huge funding base, abuse of public resources and massive vote buying, materially, Zimbabwe's 2018 elections were heavily slanted in favour of ZANU–PF.

Main article text

Context of the elections

At the turn of the 21st century, the concept of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ gained traction in the study of elections in Africa. The concept describes how authoritarian regimes use democratic processes, including elections, to legitimise their stay in power even without popular support (Levitsky and Way 2010, 5). The funding of political parties, use of public resources and vote buying in Zimbabwe's 30 July 2018 presidential, parliamentary and local government elections quintessentially fit within this conceptual framework. These elections were the first to be held after a dramatic military intervention in the governing Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU–PF) succession struggle in November 2017. This led to the stepping down of strongman President Robert Mugabe, who bowed to military and political pressure. Mugabe, who had been in power since 1980, was replaced as ZANU–PF leader, head of state and government by his former vice president, Emmerson Mnangagwa, a fellow veteran of the liberation struggle.

The elections were also held after the death of veteran opposition politician Morgan Tsvangirai, who succumbed to colon cancer in February 2018. Tsvangirai led the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T)¹ from its formation in 1999 until his death. From August 2017, Tsvangirai had led a coalition of opposition political parties called the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) (MDC-A 2018a, 5). The coalition's objective was to unite around one presidential candidate to avoid splitting votes in order to dislodge ZANU–PF from power (MDC-A 2018b, iii, 5). Tsvangirai's death divided the MDC-T as his deputies jostled to succeed him. After an acrimonious succession struggle, one of the three deputy presidents, the youthful Nelson Chamisa, outmanoeuvred the other two MDC-T deputies, Thokozani Khupe and Elias Mudzuri (Nyoka 2018). Chamisa became the leader of the main MDC-T party and, by extension, of the MDC-A. While Mudzuri reconciled with Chamisa, Khupe and her backers claimed legitimacy to lead the MDC-T² and used the party's name in the 2018 elections. The party led by Chamisa eventually contested the elections as Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A) to distinguish itself from the party led by Khupe.

Although there were 23 presidential candidates and 55 political parties (ZESN 2018b, 51–55) contested in parliamentary and local government elections, the real battle for power was between Mnangagwa and his ZANU–PF party, and Chamisa and the MDC-A (ACBOS 2018, 5). ZANU–PF and MDC-A outshone other political parties in terms of popular support, mobilisation capacity and financial spending (Ibid., 5). However, of these two, the governing ZANU–PF had a stronger financial base and greater access to state resources (Ibid, 5). This briefing advances that the electoral field was uneven and favoured ZANU–PF, which had more financial resources from illicit sources as well as unfair access to public infrastructure and resources, and was involved in electoral clientelism.

Mnangagwa, ZANU–PF and the search for legitimacy

Although Mnangagwa and his ZANU–PF government gained tacit domestic and international acceptance after the toppling of Mugabe, they understood that only free, fair and credible elections would give them legitimacy in the long term (Standard 2018b, 2018c). It is within this context that Mnangagwa strived to portray himself and his government as representing a break from the Mugabe regime, which he ironically served for 37 years as a cabinet minister, speaker of parliament and vice president. Mnangagwa portrayed himself as a democrat, a reformist and a pragmatic politician. In order to gain legitimacy at home and abroad, Mnangagwa cosmetically opened political space for freedom of expression and association.

ZANU–PF pledged to adhere to Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and African Union (AU) guidelines in the conduct of elections and to allow all international election observers entry into the country (ZANU–PF 2018, 58). For the first time since 2002, the Commonwealth Observer Group, the European Union Election Observer Mission (EUOM), and the International Republican Institute and National Democratic Institute (IRI/NDI), representing the United States, were all invited. Using the dictum ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’, one of Mnangagwa's grand objectives was to reengage Western countries which had shunned Zimbabwe for electoral malpractices, human rights abuses and poor governance since 2000.

Chamisa and the resurgence of opposition

Born on 2 February 1978, Chamisa is a founding member of the MDC-T. Before standing as a presidential candidate, he was a member of parliament, and between 2009 and 2013 he was a cabinet minister in the inclusive government formed by ZANU–PF and MDC-T. With his wit, humour and oratory skills, Chamisa is widely regarded as charismatic, and his rallies attracted thousands of people (Nyoka 2018; Standard 2018a). One of the hallmarks of Chamisa and MDC-A's campaign was the deployment of religion to appeal to Christians and obtain their votes. A graduate of a local theological college, Chamisa is an ordained pastor. He emphasised his pentecostal background and occasionally gave prayers at his rallies. In its manifesto, the MDC-A promised to create a just and democratic society led by people with strong Christian values who uphold ‘social justice, transparency, accountability and equality' (MDC-A 2018b, iii). The MDC-A blamed ZANU–PF for poor leadership, misgovernance, collapse of the rule of law, patronage, clientelism, corruption, sustaining partisan institutions, corrosive politics and lacking national vision leading to social decay, poverty and inequality (Ibid., 1, 3). The MDC-A's vision for Zimbabwe, as outlined in its manifesto, was ‘an inclusive, socially just, tolerant, transformative and democratic developmental state in which people have equal opportunities to pursue happiness’ (Ibid., iii). The MDC-A pledged to eliminate poverty and promote equitable economic growth (Ibid., 4).

Literature and opinion surveys (see Financial Gazette 2017) emerging after Zimbabwe's 2013 elections suggested that the MDC-T led by Tsvangirai was declining in popularity, for reasons varying from poor leadership to factionalism and complacency (Southall 2013, 131–151). Judging by opinion surveys conducted by Afrobarometer between May and July 2018, Chamisa revived opposition politics in the run-up to the elections. Although the surveys indicated that Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF were more likely to win the elections, they revealed a tight contest with Chamisa and the MDC-A. In early July 2018, 40% of the registered voters said they would vote for Mnangagwa, while 37% revealed their intention to vote for Chamisa (Afrobarometer 2018a, 1). However, the survey indicated that 43% of the registered voters believed Chamisa was more capable of creating jobs, while 32% saw Mnangagwa as the best candidate to create employment (Afrobarometer 2018b, 1). These surveys gave hope to the opposition movement which previous Afrobarometer opinion surveys had indicated to be losing support. Focusing on political party financing, abuse of public resources and electoral clientelism, the next section examines Zimbabwe's 2018 elections within the concept of competitive authoritarianism.

How competitive authoritarianism worked

Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way (2002, 52) introduced the concept of ‘competitive authoritarianism’ in 2002. They argue that competitive authoritarianism exists when incumbents who run authoritarian regimes recognise democratic institutions as the primary means of obtaining power and authority to govern, but they violate the basic principles of democracy and put themselves at an advantage compared to the opposition parties to the extent that they win elections and come into power (Levitsky and Way 2002, 52, 2010, 5). Thus, in practice, competitive authoritarian regimes are also hybrid regimes because they conflate democracy and authoritarianism. Competitive authoritarian regimes increased in Eurasia, Asia, Latin America and Africa after the end of the Cold War, when multiparty elections became the acceptable method of ascendancy to power and legitimacy (Levitsky and Way 2010, 3). Although competitive authoritarianism has many dimensions, including harassment of opposition election candidates and journalists, intimidation of voters and manipulation of election results (Schedler 2013, 1), this briefing focuses on unfair political party financing, abuse of public resources and vote buying.

As in any economic or social venture, funding is crucial in politics. In elections, it determines the extent to which political parties can conduct meaningful campaigns. However, the challenge worldwide is how electoral funds are acquired and how they are used. Collier and Vicente (2012, 118) warned that if the behaviour of election candidates is not monitored, illicit campaign strategies will remain unabated, political accountability will decay and then voter preferences may be overtaken by the need for public choice goods. The main reason for regulation of political party financing is to ‘ensure transparency in how political parties and election campaigns raise and spend money, stop corrupt practices, [and] limit the impact of money on the electoral process’ (IFES 2018, 1, original emphasis).

The question of the use of state and public resources in elections is central in the discourse of competitive authoritarianism. Magnus Ohman (2013, 3) states that politicians tend to use public resources to their advantage to ensure they stay in power longer. As noted by Ritchie and Shein (2017, 1), the use of state resources in elections gives incumbents ‘unfair electoral advantage’. ‘Undue advantages’ are also obtained when political parties or candidates use their official networks with state institutions to determine the outcome of electoral processes (Ibid., 1). In some instances, development projects are launched during elections to influence voters, rather than when citizens really want them (Ibid., 1). Besides this, abuse of state resources drains state funds and strains state infrastructure and social welfare programmes ( Ibid. , 1). As revealed below, Zimbabwe's 2018 elections raise serious questions about ZANU–PF's use of state resources.

Interrelated with the question of political party funding and abuse of public resources is the issue of vote buying. According to Simeon Nichter (2014, 316), in general, vote buying refers to clientelist connections between elite politicians and citizens. Elite politicians and their political parties give material goods to individual or groups of citizens to obtain political support (Ibid., 316). Eric Kramon (2018, 5) argues that a political system in which politicians are voted into power on the basis of their qualifications and policies is better than one in which politicians are elected partly because they are able to give cash and other goods. Vicente and Wantchekon (2009, 292) hold that good development policies enunciated by politicians may be overshadowed by bad practices popular with the electorate such as vote buying which are themselves detrimental to economic growth and development. Having outlined how excessive use of money, abuse of public resources and vote buying work in competitive authoritarian contexts, the following subsections locate these issues in Zimbabwe's 2018 elections.

Financing of election campaigns

In 2018, the financing of political parties in Zimbabwe was regulated by the Political Parties (Finance) Act No. 4 of 2001 (Zimbabwe Government 2001). This act regulates how citizens and other local entities finance political parties (Ibid., Sections 2, 3). According to Section 6 of the act, political parties are not allowed to use foreign funding (Ibid., Section 6). In Zimbabwe, representation in parliament determines a political party's eligibility to receive public funding. The act requires the state to fund, on a yearly basis, political parties which received at least 5% of the vote in the preceding election (EUOM 2018, 23). In 2018, only ZANU–PF and MDC-T led by Chamisa were eligible for public funding (ZESN 2018b, 63). In line with the act, ZANU–PF received US$6,126,633, and the MDC-T led by Chamisa received US$1,873,663 (EUOM 2018, 23). The Zimbabwe Electoral Support Network (ZESN) (2018b, 64), a local civil society organisation advocating for free and fair elections, is concerned because the Political Parties (Finance) Act of 2001 does not require political parties to disclose their sources of finance, amounts, finance balance sheets and audits, or how they have used public funds. This is contrary to global best practices, where the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES 2018, 1) noted that 90% of countries require political parties, candidates or both to report their financial contributions and spending. In the case of Zimbabwe, EUOM (2018, 63) noted that a lack of transparency in the source and use of funds undermines the evenness of the electoral playing field.

ZANU–PF was in a stronger financial position than its main rival, the MDC-A. Besides the funds it received from the government treasury under the Political Parties (Finance) Act, it also received funding from foreign countries (Nkomo 2018). The private print media reported that ZANU–PF was funded by the governments of the Democratic Republic Congo, Equatorial Guinea and China as well as some governments in Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Gagare 2018a, 2018b). Some parastatals and private companies, wanting to protect their business interests, donated cash to ZANU–PF (Gagare 2018b). The Zimbabwe Independent of 4 May 2018 (Gagare 2018a) claimed that the national treasury and the security sector also illegally gave ZANU–PF funds to pay polling agents. The above evidence resonates with Jabusile Shumba’s (2016, i) careful analysis of Zimbabwe's ‘predatory’ state and political economy which reveals the conflation between the ZANU–PF party, the state and the military. Furthermore, Shumba forwards that, contrary to the dominant literature which assumes a predatory state is autonomous, the Zimbabwean state has extensive clientelist networks with business (Ibid., i; see also Shumba 2018). This analysis best explains how ZANU–PF uses its networks with business and the military establishment to raise huge funds towards elections. By May 2018, ZANU–PF had raised about US$200 million (Gagare 2018a). In mid June 2018, former party leader Mugabe withdrew ZANU–PF's US$24 million from a local bank and surrendered it to the party as requested by the latter (Gagare 2018b). The above evidence shows how ZANU–PF illicitly obtained funding from foreign and domestic sources.

ZANU–PF's expenditure on billboards, posters, election regalia, rallies and road shows was high. Mnangagwa's campaign messages occupied most billboards in cities, towns and rural areas (Zhangazha 2018). See Figure 1 for an example of Mnangagwa's many huge campaign banners. ZANU–PF bought 15 million T-shirts, 15 million caps and 2 million body wrappers to entice voters (Gagare 2018b). Each of ZANU–PF's 210 House of Assembly, 60 senatorial and 60 women's quota candidates were given party vehicles (Ibid.). Some of the funds were used to support the party's visibility on radio, television and newspapers (Ibid.).

Figure 1.

An example of Mnangagwa's extraordinarily huge campaign banner, in the capital Harare's Central Business District. (Photograph by the author.)

By comparison, MDC-T led by Chamisa, the biggest opposition party in the MDC-A coalition, had been in the financial doldrums since its ‘loss’ to ZANU–PF in the 2013 elections. The party was even struggling to fund its operations as its Western donors tightened their purses (Gagare and Ndebele 2018). Out of frustration, Western funding of pro-democracy and human rights civil society organisations which sympathised with and supported MDC-T also dwindled after 2013 (Share 2018). Harare-based journalist Barnabas Thondhlana (Nyarota 2018) revealed that the idea of a grand coalition, which came in the form of MDC-A, was imposed on Tsvangirai by Western donors, particularly Britain and Australia, as a precondition for the release of funds in 2017. Despite the formation of a grand opposition, coalition funds from Western countries were not forthcoming. In 2017, MDC-T lost almost all of its property at its Harvest House headquarters in Harare over a salary dispute with former employees (Gagare and Ndebele 2018). The MDC-T was also struggling to pay its debts, and its election agents in previous elections were not sufficiently paid and cried foul (Zhangazha 2018). What is important to note here is that the MDC-T has over the years been violating the Political Parties (Financing) Act by obtaining funds from Western countries, and it continues to do so. Thus, the MDC-T, just like ZANU–PF, tends to violate laws guiding political party financing when doing so suits its interests.

Although the MDC-T led by Chamisa received US$1,873,663 from the national treasury, which it was entitled to under the Political Parties (Finance) Act of 2001, a significant percentage of this was gobbled up by debts and outstanding employees’ salaries. In an interview with the Zimbabwe Independent on 7 June 2018, MDC-T secretary general Douglas Mwonzora said his party was facing financial challenges but was receiving small donations from friends, party members and well-wishers (Ibid.). As of June 2018, MDC-T led by Chamisa was still appealing for funds for marketing, recruiting polling agents, volunteers, posters, billboards, door-to-door fliers, rallies and other campaign costs (Ibid.). During the campaign, the MDC-A presidential candidate, Chamisa, was hardly visible on billboards and it seemed to be Mnangagwa's one-man presidential race (Ibid.). Figure 2 is an example of Chamisa's few election billboards in Harare. Thus, despite his charisma, Chamisa's campaign lacked sufficient funds. Worse still, the MDC-A did not have adequate funds to post its election agents throughout the country (EUOM 2018, 23). This made it difficult for the party to provide evidence of ZANU–PF vote rigging in the presidential election result court challenge which ensued.

Figure 2.

One of the few MDC-A presidential candidate Chamisa's billboards, at Market Square in Harare's Central Business District. (Photograph by the author.)

Abuse of public resources

In addition to a stronger financial base, ZANU–PF abused state resources. For example, in ZANU–PF's primary elections, the government deployed 420 government vehicles throughout the country (Gagare 2018b). The army also reportedly deployed 5000 soldiers throughout the country to aid ZANU–PF's campaign (Ibid.). Furthermore, ZANU–PF used civil servants to support its campaign (Ibid.). In addition, state-controlled media was biased in favour of ZANU–PF. The Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC) did not take meaningful measures to ensure that the media complied with regulations in the Electoral Act designed to ensure free, equitable and balanced coverage (ZESN 2018a, 3).

IRI/NDI (2018, 32) stated that ZANU–PF's use of school buildings, supplies, personnel and vehicles worsened the disparity between the governing party and opposition political parties. In June 2018, the Amalgamated Rural Teachers Union of Zimbabwe sued ZANU–PF for forcing teachers and students to attend its meetings and for using school property (RAU 2018, 1). Consequently, on 28 June 2018, the High Court of Masvingo ruled in favour of the teachers’ union and ordered ZANU–PF to stop forcing teachers and schoolchildren to attend its rallies (Ibid.). ZANU–PF appealed to the Supreme Court which suspended the High Court's decision without giving details (IRI/NDI 2018, 32). A report of the 2018 elections produced by the IRI/NDI pointed out that the Electoral Act does not address the abuse of state resources in electoral processes (Ibid.). IRI/NDI lamented that this creates an uneven playing field which works to the advantage of the incumbent regime and undermines public trust in and the legitimacy of the electoral process (IFES 2018, 32).

Vote buying

In Zimbabwe, Section 136 (1) (c) of the Electoral Act makes it an offence for a candidate or a political party to give gifts to voters in order to obtain their votes in an election (CCZ 2018, 11). ZANU–PF used ‘various cases of inducement’, especially in the rural areas, to get votes (EUOM 2018, 21). In some areas, two years before the elections, humanitarian food aid was given on the basis of political affiliation (ZCBC and CCJPZ 2018, 10). For example, most food aid beneficiaries in Nyanga and Mutasa were ZANU–PF supporters and some people switched support for political parties in order to receive food aid (Ibid., 10). EUOM (2018, 21) observers lamented that traditional leaders and local administrators coerced people in resettlement areas to support ZANU–PF using continued access to land.

ZANU–PF also initiated government programmes at its campaign events. Fertiliser and seeds were distributed at ZANU–PF campaign rallies, and this was widely covered by the state-controlled media (EUOM 2018, 21). At the end of June 2018, ZANU–PF officially opened the Women's Bank, and on 5 July 2018, Mnangagwa officially launched the Youth Empowerment Bank at his party's event (Herald 2018a). The conflation of government and ZANU–PF events and programmes towards the 2018 elections was clearly aimed at aiding the latter's campaign. Michael Bratton (2013, 12) warned that most citizens oppose campaign manipulation and they do not always vote as politicians wish. Obviously, not all constituencies into which ZANU–PF poured goodies voted for the party. The impact of money, abuse of state resources and vote buying on the outcome of elections is difficult to measure. It must also be noted that the MDC-A and other opposition political parties also violate electoral laws; for example, they obtain foreign funding to campaign. What differs, however, is the amount of finance and public resources abused and the magnitude of violation of laws.

Arguably, a stronger financial base, abuse of state resources and vote buying benefited ZANU–PF. Election results revealed that ZANU–PF and MDC-A received most of their votes from their traditional strongholds in rural and urban areas, respectively. However, for ZANU–PF vote buying has always been more effective in rural than in urban areas. The results released by ZEC showed that in the presidential election Mnangagwa won 50.8% of votes while Chamisa obtained 44.3% (Herald 2018b, 2). In the parliamentary contest, ZANU–PF won 145 seats while MDC-A won 63 seats (Ibid.). ZANU–PF won control of 60 local authorities while MDC-A won control of 27 local authorities (IRI/NDI 2018, 47).

While the results for the parliamentary and local government elections were generally accepted, despite massive vote buying by ZANU–PF, those for the presidential elections were disputed by the MDC-A. There was a widely held belief that ZEC inflated Mnangagwa's votes to 50.8% to prevent a presidential run-off election (CiZC 2018, 5). Consequently, the MDC-A challenged the result of the presidential elections in the constitutional court citing uneven electoral ground and vote rigging by ZEC (CCZ 2018, 3, 31). Among its grievances, the MDC-A stated that members of the army were deployed in rural areas to aid ZANU–PF’s campaign (Ibid., 6). The MDC-A also accused Mnangagwa and ZANU–PF of vote buying, particularly via the distribution of seeds and fertiliser a few days before the election (Ibid., 11). Although the court challenge was unsuccessful, it left Mnangagwa's legitimacy hanging in the balance. While SADC and the AU endorsed the elections, reports by the Commonwealth Observer Group and Western observer missions concurred that the elections failed to meet international best practices. In light of the arguments raised by the MDC-A in its election result court challenge, and reports by local civil society and international observer missions, this briefing acknowledges that besides funding, abuse of public resources and vote buying, there were other factors which slanted the elections in favour of ZANU–PF.

Conclusion

Judging by the sources of ZANU–PF's campaign funds, abuse of state resources and vote buying, Zimbabwe's 2018 elections were not free and fair. Consequently, civil society organisations and Western observer missions have made recommendations to improve the legitimacy of future electoral processes. EUOM (2018, 23) recommended that, in order to promote accountability and transparency, the government should enact regulations that control campaign expenditure and reporting before the nomination process and after the declaration of results. IFES (2018, 2) suggested that there should be a resourceful independent body with an oversight role to ensure that political parties and candidates comply with political finance regulations and prevent impunity. The independent public body, as suggested by IFES, should have the power to investigate violations or potential violations of political party financing regulations (Ibid.). IFES further recommended that there should be other institutions with the power to investigate this body itself (Ibid.).

In its election report, the EUOM (2018, 21) recommended that legislative measures be taken to prevent the abuse of state resources. As recommended by Speck and Fontana (2011, 10–12) on behalf of the U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre, such legislation should prohibit the use of public resources for political campaigning, limit government monopoly of public resources and prohibit civil servants from interfering in politics. On vote buying, Speck and Fontana (2011, 12) urged governments to provide citizens with all services and goods they are entitled to in order to reduce their exchange for votes during elections. Vicente and Wantchekon (2009, 292) aver that citizens’ increased access to information and voter education reduces the impact of vote buying on citizens. The above recommendations, if put into policy and practice, will go a long way in improving electoral processes in Zimbabwe.

Notes

1

At its formation in 1999, the party led by Morgan Tsvangirai was called Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). Due to splits, Tsvangirai's party adopted the name Movement for Democratic Change – Tsvangirai (MDC-T) to distinguish itself from splinter MDC parties.

2

Thokozani Khupe's party contested the 2018 elections as MDC-T, the official name of the party led by Morgan Tsvangirai. To distinguish his party from the one led by Khupe, Chamisa's party used the name of the coalition of opposition parties led by Tsvangirai, Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-A).

Acknowledgements

I wish to thank the editor, Dr Jorg Wiegratz, and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful suggestions. I also want to thank Dr Innocent Dande and Dr Joseph Mujere for going through the first draft of this article and providing constructive criticism.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Note on contributor

Musiwaro Ndakaripa is a research fellow in the Unit of Zimbabwean Studies, Faculty of Humanities, Rhodes University, South Africa, and a senior lecturer in history and political economy at the University of Zimbabwe. He is a social justice activist who works with various social movements and business associations in Zimbabwe and is the author of A history of the Munyikwa people of Gutu District, Zimbabwe, c.1700–c.1890 (University of Zimbabwe Publications, Harare, 2017).

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