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      Extending health insurance to the poor in India: An impact evaluation of Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana on out of pocket spending for healthcare

      , ,
      Social Science & Medicine
      Elsevier BV

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          Abstract

          India launched the ‘Rashtriya Swasthya Bima Yojana’ (RSBY) health insurance scheme for the poor in 2008. Utilising 3 waves (1999–2000, 2004–05 and 2011–12) of household level data from nationally representative surveys of the National Sample Survey Organisation (NSSO) (N = 346,615) and district level RSBY administrative data on enrolment, we estimated causal effects of RSBY on out-of-pocket expenditure. Using ‘difference-in-differences’ methods on households in matched districts we find that RSBY did not affect the likelihood of inpatient out-of-pocket spending, the level of inpatient out of pocket spending or catastrophic inpatient spending. We also do not find any statistically significant effect of RSBY on the level of outpatient out-of-pocket expenditure and the probability of incurring outpatient expenditure. In contrast, the likelihood of incurring any out of pocket spending (inpatient and outpatient) rose by 30% due to RSBY and was statistically significant. Although out of pocket spending levels did not change, RSBY raised household non-medical spending by 5%. Overall, the results suggest that RSBY has been ineffective in reducing the burden of out-of-pocket spending on poor households.

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          Extending health insurance to the rural population: an impact evaluation of China's new cooperative medical scheme.

          In 2003, China launched a heavily subsidized voluntary health insurance program for rural residents. We combine differences-in-differences with matching methods to obtain impact estimates, using data collected from program administrators, health facilities and households. The scheme has increased outpatient and inpatient utilization, and has reduced the cost of deliveries. But it has not reduced out-of-pocket expenses per outpatient visit or inpatient spell. Out-of-pocket payments overall have not been reduced. We find heterogeneity across income groups and implementing counties. The program has increased ownership of expensive equipment among central township health centers but has had no impact on cost per case.
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            Health insurance and the demand for medical care: evidence from a randomized experiment.

            We estimate how cost sharing, the portion of the bill the patient pays, affects the demand for medical services. The data come from a randomized experiment. A catastrophic insurance plan reduces expenditures 31 percent relative to zero out-of-pocket price. The price elasticity is approximately -0.2. We reject the hypothesis that less favorable coverage of outpatient services increases total expenditure (for example, by deterring preventive care or inducing hospitalization).
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              • Article: not found

              Can insurance increase financial risk? The curious case of health insurance in China.

              We analyze the effect of insurance on the probability of an individual incurring 'high' annual health expenses using data from three household surveys. All come from China, a country where providers are paid fee-for-service according to a schedule that encourages the overprovision of high-tech care and who are only lightly regulated. We define annual spending as 'high' if it exceeds a threshold of local average income and as 'catastrophic' if it exceeds a threshold of the household's own per capita income. Our estimates allow for different thresholds and for the possible endogeneity of health insurance (we use instrumental variables and fixed effects). Our main results suggest that in all three surveys health insurance increases the risk of high and catastrophic spending. Further analysis suggests that this is due to insurance encouraging people to seek care when sick and to seek care from higher-level providers.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Social Science & Medicine
                Social Science & Medicine
                Elsevier BV
                02779536
                May 2017
                May 2017
                : 181
                : 83-92
                Article
                10.1016/j.socscimed.2017.03.053
                17facffe-9476-4d36-be52-66f77cbbdbda
                © 2017

                https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

                http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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