Measurement-Device-Independent Quantum Key Distribution

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Abstract

How to remove detector side channel attacks has been a notoriously hard problem in quantum cryptography. Here, we propose a simple solution to this problem--measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (QKD). It not only removes all detector side channels, but also doubles the secure distance with conventional lasers. Our proposal can be implemented with standard optical components with low detection efficiency and highly lossy channels. In contrast to the previous solution of full device independent QKD, the realization of our idea does not require detectors of near unity detection efficiency in combination with a qubit amplifier (based on teleportation) or a quantum nondemolition measurement of the number of photons in a pulse. Furthermore, its key generation rate is many orders of magnitude higher than that based on full device independent QKD. The results show that long-distance quantum cryptography over say 200 km will remain secure even with seriously flawed detectors.

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Most cited references 25

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The security of practical quantum key distribution

Valerio Scarani, Helle Bechmann-Pasquinucci, Nicolas J Cerf … (2009)

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Simple Proof of Security of the BB84 Quantum Key Distribution Protocol

Peter W. Shor, John Preskill (2000)

We prove that the 1984 protocol of Bennett and Brassard (BB84) for quantum key distribution is secure. We first give a key distribution protocol based on entanglement purification, which can be proven secure using methods from Lo and Chau's proof of security for a similar protocol. We then show that the security of this protocol implies the security of BB84. The entanglement purification based protocol uses Calderbank-Shor-Steane codes, and properties of these codes are used to remove the use of quantum computation from the Lo-Chau protocol.

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Decoy state quantum key distribution.

Hoi-Kwong Lo, Xiongfeng Ma, Kai Chen (2005)

There has been much interest in quantum key distribution. Experimentally, quantum key distribution over 150 km of commercial Telecom fibers has been successfully performed. The crucial issue in quantum key distribution is its security. Unfortunately, all recent experiments are, in principle, insecure due to real-life imperfections. Here, we propose a method that can for the first time make most of those experiments secure by using essentially the same hardware. Our method is to use decoy states to detect eavesdropping attacks. As a consequence, we have the best of both worlds--enjoying unconditional security guaranteed by the fundamental laws of physics and yet dramatically surpassing even some of the best experimental performances reported in the literature.