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      The independence of Central Banks, a reductio ad impossibile

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          Abstract

          This paper testifies to the fact that the independence of the Central Banks, as stated by its founding fathers, is nothing more than a chimera. We demonstrate that the hypothesis inflation is a purely monetary phenomenon does not support the plea for independence. Moreover, we show that the conservative central banker, the imaginary Principal-Agent contract, the alleged financial autonomy, just like the ban on budgetary financing, are all arguments that lack logic. We equally show that the idea of independence is not convincing because its operational toolbox, as well as the system of rules it relies on, lack well-defined outlines.

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          Journal
          22 August 2023
          Article
          2311.10716
          25e9c94f-50e7-4da1-af31-f779769fdce5

          http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

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          Custom metadata
          econ.GN q-fin.EC q-fin.GN

          General economics
          General economics

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