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      The Moving Rubber Hand Illusion Reveals that Explicit Sense of Agency for Tapping Movements Is Preserved in Functional Movement Disorders

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          Abstract

          Functional movement disorders (FMD) are characterized by motor symptoms (e.g., tremor, gait disorder, and dystonia) that are not compatible with movement abnormalities related to a known organic cause. One key clinical feature of FMD is that motor symptoms are similar to voluntary movements but are subjectively experienced as involuntary by patients. This gap might be related to abnormal self-recognition of bodily action, which involves two main components: sense of agency and sense of body ownership. The aim of this study was to systematically investigate whether this function is altered in FMD, specifically focusing on the subjective feeling of agency, body ownership, and their interaction during normal voluntary movements. Patients with FMD ( n = 21) and healthy controls ( n = 21) underwent the moving Rubber Hand Illusion (mRHI), in which passive and active movements can differentially elicit agency, ownership or both. Explicit measures of agency and ownership were obtained via a questionnaire. Patients and controls showed a similar pattern of response: when the rubber hand was in a plausible posture, active movements elicited strong agency and ownership; implausible posture of the rubber hand abolished ownership but not agency; passive movements suppressed agency but not ownership. These findings suggest that explicit sense of agency and body ownership are preserved in FMD. The latter finding is shared by a previous study in FMD using a static version of the RHI, whereas the former appears to contrast with studies demonstrating altered implicit measures of agency (e.g., sensory attenuation). Our study extends previous findings by suggesting that in FMD: (i) the sense of body ownership is retained also when interacting with the motor system; (ii) the subjective experience of agency for voluntary tapping movements, as measured by means of mRHI, is preserved.

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          Most cited references43

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          Central cancellation of self-produced tickle sensation.

          A self-produced tactile stimulus is perceived as less ticklish than the same stimulus generated externally. We used fMRI to examine neural responses when subjects experienced a tactile stimulus that was either self-produced or externally produced. More activity was found in somatosensory cortex when the stimulus was externally produced. In the cerebellum, less activity was associated with a movement that generated a tactile stimulus than with a movement that did not. This difference suggests that the cerebellum is involved in predicting the specific sensory consequences of movements, providing the signal that is used to cancel the sensory response to self-generated stimulation.
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            Sense of agency in the human brain

            The experience of controlling our own actions is an important feature of human mental life. The processes giving rise to this experience are thought to be disrupted in some psychiatric disorders. In this article, Haggard describes recent developments in our understanding of the cognitive processes and neural mechanisms underlying the sense of agency.
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              Beyond the comparator model: a multifactorial two-step account of agency.

              There is an increasing amount of empirical work investigating the sense of agency, i.e. the registration that we are the initiators of our own actions. Many studies try to relate the sense of agency to an internal feed-forward mechanism, called the "comparator model". In this paper, we draw a sharp distinction between a non-conceptual level of feeling of agency and a conceptual level of judgement of agency. By analyzing recent empirical studies, we show that the comparator model is not able to explain either. Rather, we argue for a two-step account: a multifactorial weighting process of different agency indicators accounts for the feeling of agency, which is, in a second step, further processed by conceptual modules to form an attribution judgement. This new framework is then applied to disruptions of agency in schizophrenia, for which the comparator model also fails. Two further extensions are discussed: We show that the comparator model can neither be extended to account for the sense of ownership (which also has to be differentiated into a feeling and a judgement of ownership) nor for the sense of agency for thoughts. Our framework, however, is able to provide a unified account for the sense of agency for both actions and thoughts.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Front Hum Neurosci
                Front Hum Neurosci
                Front. Hum. Neurosci.
                Frontiers in Human Neuroscience
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1662-5161
                06 June 2017
                2017
                : 11
                : 291
                Affiliations
                [1] 1Department of Neurosciences, Biomedicine and Movement Sciences, University of Verona Verona, Italy
                [2] 2Neurology Unit, Neuroscience Department, Azienda Ospedaliera Universitaria Integrata Verona, Italy
                [3] 3CiMeC Center for Mind/Brain Sciences, University of Trento Rovereto, Italy
                [4] 4Department of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento Rovereto, Italy
                [5] 5Division of Neurology, Civil Hospital, Azienda Ospedaliera della Provincia di Pavia Voghera, Italy
                Author notes

                Edited by: Mikhail Lebedev, Duke University, United States

                Reviewed by: Konstantina Kilteni, Karolinska Institutet, Sweden; Noham Wolpe, University of Cambridge, United Kingdom; Francesca Garbarini, University of Turin, Italy; Martina Gandola, University of Pavia, Italy

                *Correspondence: Angela Marotta, angela.marotta@ 123456univr.it

                These authors have contributed equally to this work.

                Article
                10.3389/fnhum.2017.00291
                5459911
                28634447
                29c935d6-95aa-488f-8505-d6e26bf8dcb1
                Copyright © 2017 Marotta, Bombieri, Zampini, Schena, Dallocchio, Fiorio and Tinazzi.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 13 March 2017
                : 18 May 2017
                Page count
                Figures: 5, Tables: 4, Equations: 0, References: 57, Pages: 15, Words: 0
                Categories
                Neuroscience
                Original Research

                Neurosciences
                self-recognition,bodily actions,sense of agency,sense of body ownership,functional movement disorders,rubber hand illusion

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