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      COVID-19: smoke testing of surgical mask and respirators

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          Abstract

          Background

          Fluid Resistant Surgical Masks have been implemented in UK personal protective equipment (PPE) guidelines for COVID-19 for all care sites that do not include aerosol-generating procedures (AGPs). FFP3 masks are used in AGP areas. Concerns from the ENT and plastic surgery communities out with intensive care units have questioned this policy. Emerging evidence on cough clouds and health care worker deaths has suggested that a review is required.

          Aims

          To test the efficacy of Fluid Resistant Surgical Mask with and without adaptions for respiratory protection. To test the efficacy of FFP and FFP3 regarding fit testing and usage.

          Methods

          A smoke chamber test of 5 min to model an 8-h working shift of exposure while wearing UK guideline PPE using an inspiratory breathing mouthpiece under the mask. Photographic data were used for comparison.

          Results

          The Fluid Resistant Surgical Mask gave no protection to inhaled smoke particles. Modifications with tape and three mask layers gave slight benefit but were not considered practical. FFP3 gave complete protection to inhaled smoke but strap tension needs to be ‘just right’ to prevent facial trauma. Facial barrier creams are an infection risk.

          Conclusions

          Surgical masks give no protection to respirable particles. Emerging evidence on cough clouds and health care worker deaths suggests the implementation of a precautionary policy of FFP3 for all locations exposed to symptomatic or diagnosed COVID-19 patients. PPE fit testing and usage policy need to improve to include daily buddy checks for FFP3 users

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          Most cited references12

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          Aerosol and Surface Stability of SARS-CoV-2 as Compared with SARS-CoV-1

          To the Editor: A novel human coronavirus that is now named severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (formerly called HCoV-19) emerged in Wuhan, China, in late 2019 and is now causing a pandemic. 1 We analyzed the aerosol and surface stability of SARS-CoV-2 and compared it with SARS-CoV-1, the most closely related human coronavirus. 2 We evaluated the stability of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 in aerosols and on various surfaces and estimated their decay rates using a Bayesian regression model (see the Methods section in the Supplementary Appendix, available with the full text of this letter at NEJM.org). SARS-CoV-2 nCoV-WA1-2020 (MN985325.1) and SARS-CoV-1 Tor2 (AY274119.3) were the strains used. Aerosols (<5 μm) containing SARS-CoV-2 (105.25 50% tissue-culture infectious dose [TCID50] per milliliter) or SARS-CoV-1 (106.75-7.00 TCID50 per milliliter) were generated with the use of a three-jet Collison nebulizer and fed into a Goldberg drum to create an aerosolized environment. The inoculum resulted in cycle-threshold values between 20 and 22, similar to those observed in samples obtained from the upper and lower respiratory tract in humans. Our data consisted of 10 experimental conditions involving two viruses (SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1) in five environmental conditions (aerosols, plastic, stainless steel, copper, and cardboard). All experimental measurements are reported as means across three replicates. SARS-CoV-2 remained viable in aerosols throughout the duration of our experiment (3 hours), with a reduction in infectious titer from 103.5 to 102.7 TCID50 per liter of air. This reduction was similar to that observed with SARS-CoV-1, from 104.3 to 103.5 TCID50 per milliliter (Figure 1A). SARS-CoV-2 was more stable on plastic and stainless steel than on copper and cardboard, and viable virus was detected up to 72 hours after application to these surfaces (Figure 1A), although the virus titer was greatly reduced (from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter of medium after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.7 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). The stability kinetics of SARS-CoV-1 were similar (from 103.4 to 100.7 TCID50 per milliliter after 72 hours on plastic and from 103.6 to 100.6 TCID50 per milliliter after 48 hours on stainless steel). On copper, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 4 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours. On cardboard, no viable SARS-CoV-2 was measured after 24 hours and no viable SARS-CoV-1 was measured after 8 hours (Figure 1A). Both viruses had an exponential decay in virus titer across all experimental conditions, as indicated by a linear decrease in the log10TCID50 per liter of air or milliliter of medium over time (Figure 1B). The half-lives of SARS-CoV-2 and SARS-CoV-1 were similar in aerosols, with median estimates of approximately 1.1 to 1.2 hours and 95% credible intervals of 0.64 to 2.64 for SARS-CoV-2 and 0.78 to 2.43 for SARS-CoV-1 (Figure 1C, and Table S1 in the Supplementary Appendix). The half-lives of the two viruses were also similar on copper. On cardboard, the half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was longer than that of SARS-CoV-1. The longest viability of both viruses was on stainless steel and plastic; the estimated median half-life of SARS-CoV-2 was approximately 5.6 hours on stainless steel and 6.8 hours on plastic (Figure 1C). Estimated differences in the half-lives of the two viruses were small except for those on cardboard (Figure 1C). Individual replicate data were noticeably “noisier” (i.e., there was more variation in the experiment, resulting in a larger standard error) for cardboard than for other surfaces (Fig. S1 through S5), so we advise caution in interpreting this result. We found that the stability of SARS-CoV-2 was similar to that of SARS-CoV-1 under the experimental circumstances tested. This indicates that differences in the epidemiologic characteristics of these viruses probably arise from other factors, including high viral loads in the upper respiratory tract and the potential for persons infected with SARS-CoV-2 to shed and transmit the virus while asymptomatic. 3,4 Our results indicate that aerosol and fomite transmission of SARS-CoV-2 is plausible, since the virus can remain viable and infectious in aerosols for hours and on surfaces up to days (depending on the inoculum shed). These findings echo those with SARS-CoV-1, in which these forms of transmission were associated with nosocomial spread and super-spreading events, 5 and they provide information for pandemic mitigation efforts.
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            Turbulent Gas Clouds and Respiratory Pathogen Emissions: Potential Implications for Reducing Transmission of COVID-19

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              Is Open Access

              Aerosol emission and superemission during human speech increase with voice loudness

              Mechanistic hypotheses about airborne infectious disease transmission have traditionally emphasized the role of coughing and sneezing, which are dramatic expiratory events that yield both easily visible droplets and large quantities of particles too small to see by eye. Nonetheless, it has long been known that normal speech also yields large quantities of particles that are too small to see by eye, but are large enough to carry a variety of communicable respiratory pathogens. Here we show that the rate of particle emission during normal human speech is positively correlated with the loudness (amplitude) of vocalization, ranging from approximately 1 to 50 particles per second (0.06 to 3 particles per cm3) for low to high amplitudes, regardless of the language spoken (English, Spanish, Mandarin, or Arabic). Furthermore, a small fraction of individuals behaves as “speech superemitters,” consistently releasing an order of magnitude more particles than their peers. Our data demonstrate that the phenomenon of speech superemission cannot be fully explained either by the phonic structures or the amplitude of the speech. These results suggest that other unknown physiological factors, varying dramatically among individuals, could affect the probability of respiratory infectious disease transmission, and also help explain the existence of superspreaders who are disproportionately responsible for outbreaks of airborne infectious disease.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Occup Med (Lond)
                Occup Med (Lond)
                occmed
                Occupational Medicine (Oxford, England)
                Oxford University Press (UK )
                0962-7480
                1471-8405
                05 November 2020
                : kqaa167
                Affiliations
                [1 ] Tweeddale Medical Practice, Fort William Health Centre , Fort William, Scotland, UK
                [2 ] Geo-Rope Ltd , West Quarry, Ballachulish, Argyll, Scotland, UK
                [3 ] Canniseburn Department of Plastic Surgery, Glasgow Royal Infirmary , Glasgow, Scotland, UK
                [4 ] ENT Surgery Department, Gartnavel General Hospital , Glasgow, Scotland, UK
                Author notes
                Correspondence to: J. D. M. Douglas, Tweeddale Medical Practice, Fort William Health Centre, Fort William, Scotland PH33 7AQ, UK. Tel: 01397 703136; e-mail: james.douglas2@ 123456nhs.scot
                Author information
                http://orcid.org/0000-0001-9199-4810
                Article
                kqaa167
                10.1093/occmed/kqaa167
                7665646
                33150448
                43578f50-1cf4-41a3-82f3-cf3dce581e87
                © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society of Occupational Medicine. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com

                This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model ( https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)

                This article is made available via the PMC Open Access Subset for unrestricted re-use and analyses in any form or by any means with acknowledgement of the original source. These permissions are granted for the duration of the COVID-19 pandemic or until permissions are revoked in writing. Upon expiration of these permissions, PMC is granted a perpetual license to make this article available via PMC and Europe PMC, consistent with existing copyright protections.

                History
                Page count
                Pages: 8
                Categories
                Original Paper
                AcademicSubjects/MED00640
                Custom metadata
                PAP

                Occupational & Environmental medicine
                covid-19,health care worker,occupational exposure,personal protective equipment

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