Only One? The Default Interventionist Perspective as a Unimodel—Commentary on Evans & Stanovich (2013)

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Abstract

Evans and Stanovich (2013, this issue) defend the dual-processing theories of higher cognition after first criticizing them on fundamental grounds. To make that possible, they resurrect the very distinctions between the two alleged "types" of processing that they formerly had rejected. At the end, however, the default-interventionist model they embrace, seems similar to the single-process unimodel they contest.

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Separate neural systems value immediate and delayed monetary rewards.

Samuel M. McClure, David Laibson, George Loewenstein … (2004)

When humans are offered the choice between rewards available at different points in time, the relative values of the options are discounted according to their expected delays until delivery. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we examined the neural correlates of time discounting while subjects made a series of choices between monetary reward options that varied by delay to delivery. We demonstrate that two separate systems are involved in such decisions. Parts of the limbic system associated with the midbrain dopamine system, including paralimbic cortex, are preferentially activated by decisions involving immediately available rewards. In contrast, regions of the lateral prefrontal cortex and posterior parietal cortex are engaged uniformly by intertemporal choices irrespective of delay. Furthermore, the relative engagement of the two systems is directly associated with subjects' choices, with greater relative fronto-parietal activity when subjects choose longer term options.

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Integration of the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious.

M Epstein (1994)

Cognitive-experiential self-theory integrates the cognitive and the psychodynamic unconscious by assuming the existence of two parallel, interacting modes of information processing: a rational system and an emotionally driven experiential system. Support for the theory is provided by the convergence of a wide variety of theoretical positions on two similar processing modes; by real-life phenomena--such as conflicts between the heart and the head; the appeal of concrete, imagistic, and narrative representations; superstitious thinking; and the ubiquity of religion throughout recorded history--and by laboratory research, including the prediction of new phenomena in heuristic reasoning.