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      The role of social cognition in decision making

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          Abstract

          Successful decision making in a social setting depends on our ability to understand the intentions, emotions and beliefs of others. The mirror system allows us to understand other people's motor actions and action intentions. ‘Empathy’ allows us to understand and share emotions and sensations with others. ‘Theory of mind’ allows us to understand more abstract concepts such as beliefs or wishes in others. In all these cases, evidence has accumulated that we use the specific neural networks engaged in processing mental states in ourselves to understand the same mental states in others. However, the magnitude of the brain activity in these shared networks is modulated by contextual appraisal of the situation or the other person. An important feature of decision making in a social setting concerns the interaction of reason and emotion. We consider four domains where such interactions occur: our sense of fairness, altruistic punishment, trust and framing effects. In these cases, social motivations and emotions compete with each other, while higher-level control processes modulate the interactions of these low-level biases.

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          Most cited references77

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          Empathy for pain involves the affective but not sensory components of pain.

          Our ability to have an experience of another's pain is characteristic of empathy. Using functional imaging, we assessed brain activity while volunteers experienced a painful stimulus and compared it to that elicited when they observed a signal indicating that their loved one--present in the same room--was receiving a similar pain stimulus. Bilateral anterior insula (AI), rostral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), brainstem, and cerebellum were activated when subjects received pain and also by a signal that a loved one experienced pain. AI and ACC activation correlated with individual empathy scores. Activity in the posterior insula/secondary somatosensory cortex, the sensorimotor cortex (SI/MI), and the caudal ACC was specific to receiving pain. Thus, a neural response in AI and rostral ACC, activated in common for "self" and "other" conditions, suggests that the neural substrate for empathic experience does not involve the entire "pain matrix." We conclude that only that part of the pain network associated with its affective qualities, but not its sensory qualities, mediates empathy.
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            The functional architecture of human empathy.

            Empathy accounts for the naturally occurring subjective experience of similarity between the feelings expressed by self and others without loosing sight of whose feelings belong to whom. Empathy involves not only the affective experience of the other person's actual or inferred emotional state but also some minimal recognition and understanding of another's emotional state. In light of multiple levels of analysis ranging from developmental psychology, social psychology, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical neuropsychology, this article proposes a model of empathy that involves parallel and distributed processing in a number of dissociable computational mechanisms. Shared neural representations, self-awareness, mental flexibility, and emotion regulation constitute the basic macrocomponents of empathy, which are underpinned by specific neural systems. This functional model may be used to make specific predictions about the various empathy deficits that can be encountered in different forms of social and neurological disorders.
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              Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others.

              The neural processes underlying empathy are a subject of intense interest within the social neurosciences. However, very little is known about how brain empathic responses are modulated by the affective link between individuals. We show here that empathic responses are modulated by learned preferences, a result consistent with economic models of social preferences. We engaged male and female volunteers in an economic game, in which two confederates played fairly or unfairly, and then measured brain activity with functional magnetic resonance imaging while these same volunteers observed the confederates receiving pain. Both sexes exhibited empathy-related activation in pain-related brain areas (fronto-insular and anterior cingulate cortices) towards fair players. However, these empathy-related responses were significantly reduced in males when observing an unfair person receiving pain. This effect was accompanied by increased activation in reward-related areas, correlated with an expressed desire for revenge. We conclude that in men (at least) empathic responses are shaped by valuation of other people's social behaviour, such that they empathize with fair opponents while favouring the physical punishment of unfair opponents, a finding that echoes recent evidence for altruistic punishment.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Philos Trans R Soc Lond B Biol Sci
                RSTB
                Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
                The Royal Society (London )
                0962-8436
                1471-2970
                1 October 2008
                12 December 2008
                : 363
                : 1511 , Theme Issue ‘Neuroeconomics’ compiled by Wolfram Schultz
                : 3875-3886
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Center for Functional Integrative Neuroscience, Aarhus University Hospital Nørrebrogade 44, Building 30, 8000 Århus C, Denmark
                [2 ]Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at University College London 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK
                [3 ]Center for Social and Neural Systems, University of Zurich Blümlisalpstrasse 10, 8006 Zurich, Switzerland
                Author notes
                [* ]Author and address for correspondence: Wellcome Trust Centre for Neuroimaging at University College London, 12 Queen Square, London WC1N 3BG, UK ( cfrith@ 123456fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk )
                Article
                rstb20080156
                10.1098/rstb.2008.0156
                2581783
                18829429
                81377d45-77f3-4388-97a3-5bd1debd489e
                Copyright © 2008 The Royal Society

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.

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                Categories
                Review

                Philosophy of science
                theory of mind,trust,social cognition,mirror neurons,empathy,joint action
                Philosophy of science
                theory of mind, trust, social cognition, mirror neurons, empathy, joint action

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