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      The Impact of Regulations, Safety Considerations and Physical Limitations on Research Progress at Maximum Biocontainment

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          Abstract

          We describe herein, limitations on research at biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) containment laboratories, with regard to biosecurity regulations, safety considerations, research space limitations, and physical constraints in executing experimental procedures. These limitations can severely impact the number of collaborations and size of research projects investigating microbial pathogens of biodefense concern. Acquisition, use, storage, and transfer of biological select agents and toxins (BSAT) are highly regulated due to their potential to pose a severe threat to public health and safety. All federal, state, city, and local regulations must be followed to obtain and maintain registration for the institution to conduct research involving BSAT. These include initial screening and continuous monitoring of personnel, controlled access to containment laboratories, accurate and current BSAT inventory records. Safety considerations are paramount in BSL-4 containment laboratories while considering the types of research tools, workflow and time required for conducting both in vivo and in vitro experiments in limited space. Required use of a positive-pressure encapsulating suit imposes tremendous physical limitations on the researcher. Successful mitigation of these constraints requires additional time, effort, good communication, and creative solutions. Test and evaluation of novel vaccines and therapeutics conducted under good laboratory practice (GLP) conditions for FDA approval are prioritized and frequently share the same physical space with important ongoing basic research studies. The possibilities and limitations of biomedical research involving microbial pathogens of biodefense concern in BSL-4 containment laboratories are explored in this review.

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          Virus inactivation by nucleic acid extraction reagents.

          Many assume that common methods to extract viral nucleic acids are able to render a sample non-infectious. It may be that inactivation of infectious virus is incomplete during viral nucleic acid extraction methods. Accordingly, two common viral nucleic acid extraction techniques were evaluated for the ability to inactivate high viral titer specimens. In particular, the potential for TRIzol LS Reagent (Invitrogen Corp., Carlsbad, CA) and AVL Buffer (Qiagen, Valencia, CA) were examined to render suspensions of alphaviruses, flaviviruses, filoviruses and a bunyavirus non-infectious to tissue culture assay. The dilution series for both extraction reagents consistently caused cell death through a 100-fold dilution. Except for the DEN subtype 4 positive control, all viruses had titers of at least 10(6)pfu/ml. No plaques were detected in any extraction reagent plus virus combination in this study, therefore, the extraction reagents appeared to inactivate completely each of the high-titer viruses used in this study. These results support the reliance upon either TRIzol LS Reagent or AVL Buffer to render clinical or environmental samples non-infectious, which has implications for the handling and processing of samples under austere field conditions and low level containment.
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            Establishing efficacy of human products using animals: the US food and drug administration's "animal rule".

            P Snoy (2010)
            In 2002, the US Food and Drug Administration issued regulations to allow the approval of human drugs and biological products based on animal efficacy studies when human efficacy studies would be unethical or not feasible. These regulations are intended to assist in the approval process for products aimed at preventing or treating human diseases caused by nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical agents that have the potential to harm a significant percentage of the US population. This article discusses the criteria that must be met to use the Animal Rule to demonstrate efficacy in place of human clinical trials.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Viruses
                Viruses
                viruses
                Viruses
                MDPI
                1999-4915
                19 December 2012
                December 2012
                : 4
                : 12
                : 3932-3951
                Affiliations
                [1 ]Integrated Toxicology Division, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, MD 21702, USA; E-Mails: amy.c.shurtleff.ctr@ 123456us.army.mil (A.C.S.); nicole.garza@ 123456us.army.mil (N.G.)
                [2 ]Integrated Research Facility Frederick, Division of Clinical Research, National Institute of Allergy and Immunology, National Institute of Health, Frederick, MD 21702, USA; E-Mail: matthew.lackemeyer@ 123456nih.gov
                [3 ]Department of Virology and Immunology, Texas Biomedical Research Institute, San Antonio, TX 78245, USA; E-Mails: carrion@ 123456txbiomed.org (R.C.); agriffiths@ 123456txbiomed.org (A.G.); jpatters@ 123456txbiomed.org (J.P.)
                [4 ]Select Agent Management Division, United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, 1425 Porter Street, Fort Detrick, MD 21702, USA; E-Mail: samuel.edwin@ 123456us.army.mil
                Author notes
                [* ] Author to whom correspondence should be addressed; E-Mail: sina.bavari@ 123456us.army.mil ; Tel.: +1-301-619-4246; Fax: +1-301-619-0350.
                Article
                viruses-04-03932
                10.3390/v4123932
                3528297
                23342380
                8eb075a9-7e13-471f-aabd-3658af264256
                © 2012 by the authors; licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland.

                This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution license ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).

                History
                : 22 November 2012
                : 14 December 2012
                : 14 December 2012
                Categories
                Review

                Microbiology & Virology
                biocontainment,biosafety level 4 (bsl-4),biological select agents and toxins (bsat),positive pressure suit,biodefense,biosecurity,ebola virus,highly pathogenic viruses,limitations,collaboration

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