57
views
0
recommends
+1 Recommend
0 collections
    0
    shares
      • Record: found
      • Abstract: not found
      • Article: not found

      The somatic marker hypothesis: A critical evaluation

      , ,
      Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
      Elsevier BV

      Read this article at

      ScienceOpenPublisherPubMed
      Bookmark
          There is no author summary for this article yet. Authors can add summaries to their articles on ScienceOpen to make them more accessible to a non-specialist audience.

          Abstract

          The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH; [Damasio, A. R., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., 1991. Somatic markers and the guidance of behaviour: theory and preliminary testing. In Levin, H.S., Eisenberg, H.M., Benton, A.L. (Eds.), Frontal Lobe Function and Dysfunction. Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 217-229]) proposes that emotion-based biasing signals arising from the body are integrated in higher brain regions, in particular the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC), to regulate decision-making in situations of complexity. Evidence for the SMH is largely based on performance on the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT; [Bechara, A., Tranel, D., Damasio, H., Damasio, A.R., 1996. Failure to respond autonomically to anticipated future outcomes following damage to prefrontal cortex. Cerebral Cortex 6 (2), 215-225]), linking anticipatory skin conductance responses (SCRs) to successful performance on a decision-making paradigm in healthy participants. These 'marker' signals were absent in patients with VMPFC lesions and were associated with poorer IGT performance. The current article reviews the IGT findings, arguing that their interpretation is undermined by the cognitive penetrability of the reward/punishment schedule, ambiguity surrounding interpretation of the psychophysiological data, and a shortage of causal evidence linking peripheral feedback to IGT performance. Further, there are other well-specified and parsimonious explanations that can equally well account for the IGT data. Next, lesion, neuroimaging, and psychopharmacology data evaluating the proposed neural substrate underpinning the SMH are reviewed. Finally, conceptual reservations about the novelty, parsimony and specification of the SMH are raised. It is concluded that while presenting an elegant theory of how emotion influences decision-making, the SMH requires additional empirical support to remain tenable.

          Related collections

          Most cited references186

          • Record: found
          • Abstract: not found
          • Article: not found

          On the psychology of prediction.

            Bookmark
            • Record: found
            • Abstract: found
            • Article: not found

            How do you feel? Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body.

            A. Craig (2002)
            As humans, we perceive feelings from our bodies that relate our state of well-being, our energy and stress levels, our mood and disposition. How do we have these feelings? What neural processes do they represent? Recent functional anatomical work has detailed an afferent neural system in primates and in humans that represents all aspects of the physiological condition of the physical body. This system constitutes a representation of 'the material me', and might provide a foundation for subjective feelings, emotion and self-awareness.
              Bookmark
              • Record: found
              • Abstract: found
              • Article: not found

              Risk as feelings.

              Virtually all current theories of choice under risk or uncertainty are cognitive and consequentialist. They assume that people assess the desirability and likelihood of possible outcomes of choice alternatives and integrate this information through some type of expectation-based calculus to arrive at a decision. The authors propose an alternative theoretical perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at the moment of decision making. Drawing on research from clinical, physiological, and other subfields of psychology, they show that emotional reactions to risky situations often diverge from cognitive assessments of those risks. When such divergence occurs, emotional reactions often drive behavior. The risk-as-feelings hypothesis is shown to explain a wide range of phenomena that have resisted interpretation in cognitive-consequentialist terms.
                Bookmark

                Author and article information

                Journal
                Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
                Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
                Elsevier BV
                01497634
                January 2006
                January 2006
                : 30
                : 2
                : 239-271
                Article
                10.1016/j.neubiorev.2005.07.001
                16197997
                b4251c11-233d-45d6-9d6d-bb556bc75369
                © 2006

                https://www.elsevier.com/tdm/userlicense/1.0/

                History

                Comments

                Comment on this article