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      On the reality of the conjunction fallacy

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      Memory & Cognition
      Springer Nature

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          Abstract

          Attributing higher "probability" to a sentence of form p-and-q, relative to p, is a reasoning fallacy only if (1) the word probability carries its modern, technical meaning and (2) the sentence p is interpreted as a conjunct of the conjunction p-and-q. Legitimate doubts arise about both conditions in classic demonstrations of the conjunction fallacy. We used betting paradigms and unambiguously conjunctive statements to reduce these sources of ambiguity about conjunctive reasoning. Despite the precautions, conjunction fallacies were as frequent under betting instructions as under standard probability instructions.

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          Probabilistic mental models: a Brunswikian theory of confidence.

          Research on people's confidence in their general knowledge has to date produced two fairly stable effects, many inconsistent results, and no comprehensive theory. We propose such a comprehensive framework, the theory of probabilistic mental models (PMM theory). The theory (a) explains both the overconfidence effect (mean confidence is higher than percentage of answers correct) and the hard-easy effect (overconfidence increases with item difficulty) reported in the literature and (b) predicts conditions under which both effects appear, disappear, or invert. In addition, (c) it predicts a new phenomenon, the confidence-frequency effect, a systematic difference between a judgment of confidence in a single event (i.e., that any given answer is correct) and a judgment of the frequency of correct answers in the long run. Two experiments are reported that support PMM theory by confirming these predictions, and several apparent anomalies reported in the literature are explained and integrated into the present framework.
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            On the reality of cognitive illusions.

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              On narrow norms and vague heuristics: A reply to Kahneman and Tversky.

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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Memory & Cognition
                Mem Cogn
                Springer Nature
                0090-502X
                1532-5946
                March 2002
                March 2002
                : 30
                : 2
                : 191-198
                Article
                10.3758/BF03195280
                12035881
                d49a64b2-e3a9-4c09-bada-35096d82e309
                © 2002
                History

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