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Abstract
Moral agency is manifested in both the power to refrain from behaving inhumanely and
the proactive power to behave humanely. Moral agency is embedded in a broader sociocognitive
self theory encompassing self-organizing, proactive, self-reflective, and self-regulatory
mechanisms rooted in personal standards linked to self-sanctions. The self-regulatory
mechanisms governing moral conduct do not come into play unless they are activated,
and there are many psychosocial maneuvers by which moral self-sanctions are selectively
disengaged from inhumane conduct. The moral disengagement may center on the cognitive
restructuring of inhumane conduct into a benign or worthy one by moral justification,
sanitizing language, and advantageous comparison; disavowal of a sense of personal
agency by diffusion or displacement of responsibility; disregarding or minimizing
the injurious effects of one's actions; and attribution of blame to, and dehumanization
of, those who are victimized. Many inhumanities operate through a supportive network
of legitimate enterprises run by otherwise considerate people who contribute to destructive
activities by disconnected subdivision of functions and diffusion of responsibility.
Given the many mechanisms for disengaging moral control, civilized life requires,
in addition to humane personal standards, safeguards built into social systems that
uphold compassionate behavior and renounce cruelty.