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      The Genealogy of Dementia Praecox I: Signs and Symptoms of Delusional Psychoses From 1880 to 1900

      Schizophrenia Bulletin
      Oxford University Press (OUP)

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          Abstract

          We can trace, with high congruence, the clinical syndromes of depression and mania as described over the 20th century in psychiatric textbooks back to 1880 and to the earliest writing of Kraepelin published in 1883. However, this is not the case for Kraepelin’s 2 delusional syndromes central to his overall nosology: Dementia Paranoides (later paranoid schizophrenia) and Paranoia. A detailed examination of 28 textbook descriptions of delusional psychoses from 1880 to 1900 reveals a diverse and partially overlapping set of syndromes with an admixture of symptoms and signs that would later be considered indicative of Dementia Paranoides and Paranoia. A similar pattern in seen in Kraepelin’s own description of “Primäre Verrücktheit” from the first edition of his textbook (1883). No clear prototypes emerged in these textbooks or in Kraepelin’s early writings for the 2 distinct delusional syndromes that would later evolve in his mature writings. Rather, the nosologic approach taken in these writings was symptom based and assumed that a viable diagnostic category could be constituted by including all delusional patients once those suffering from organic or mood disorders were excluded. While Kraepelin used the historical syndromes of mania and depression, with no appreciable change, as building blocks for his category of manic-depressive insanity, his nosologic system for the psychotic disorders—the syndromes of Dementia Praecox and Paranoia—was more innovative and without clear precedent in the prior psychiatric literature.

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          Most cited references7

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          Phenomenology of Schizophrenia and the Representativeness of Modern Diagnostic Criteria

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            DSM disorders and their criteria: how should they inter-relate?

            K Kendler (2017)
            While the changes in psychiatric diagnosis introduced by Diagnostic and Statistical Manual third edition (DSM-III) have had major benefits to the field of psychiatry, the reification of its diagnostic criteria and the widespread adoption of diagnostic literalism have been problematic. I argue that, at root, these developments can be best understood by contrasting two approaches to the relationship between DSM disorders and their criteria. In a constitutive relationship, criteria definitively define the disorder. Having a disorder is nothing more than meeting the criteria. In an indexical relationship, the criteria are fallible indices of a disorder understood as a hypothetical, tentative diagnostic construct. I trace the origins of the constitutive model to the philosophical theory of operationalism. I then examine a range of historical and empirical results that favor the indexical over the constitutive position including (i) evidence that individual criteria for DSM-III were selected from a broader pool of possible symptoms/signs, (ii) revisions of DSM have implicitly assumed an indexical criteria-disorder relationship, (iii) the indexical position allows DSM criteria to be wrong and misdiagnose patients while such a result is incoherent for a constitutive model, an implausible position, (iv) we assume an indexical criteria-scale relationships for many personality and symptom measures commonly used in psychiatric practice and research, and (v) empirical studies suggesting similar performance for DSM and non-DSM symptoms for major depression. I then review four reasons for the rise of the constitutive position: (i) the ‘official’ nature of the DSM criteria, (ii) the strong investment psychiatry has had in the DSM manual and its widespread use and success, iii) lack of a clear pathophysiology for our disorders, and (iv) the absence of informative diagnostic signs of minimal clinical importance. I conclude that the constitutive position is premature and reflects a conceptual error. It assumes a definitiveness and a literalism about the nature of our criteria that is far beyond our current knowledge. The indexical position with its tentativeness and modesty accurately reflects the current state of our field.
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              Kahlbaum, Hecker, and Kraepelin and the Transition From Psychiatric Symptom Complexes to Empirical Disease Forms.

              The nosology for major psychiatric disorders developed by Emil Kraepelin in the 1890s has substantially shaped psychiatry. His theories, however, did not arise de novo, being strongly influenced by Karl Kahlbaum and Ewald Hecker. From the 1860-1880s, they articulated a paradigm shift in the conceptualization of psychiatric diagnosis, from symptom-based syndromes, popular since the late 18th century, to proto-disease entities. This effort was influenced by parallel developments in general medicine, especially the rise of bacterial theories of disease where different syndromes had distinctive symptoms, courses, and etiologies. Their thinking was particularly shaped by the increasing understanding of general paresis of the insane. Indeed, this disorder, with its distinct course and characteristic symptoms, was paradigmatic for them. Their hope was that a similar progression of medical understanding would evolve for the other major psychiatric syndromes. Their thinking and its connection with Kraepelin's nosology are illustrated through a close reading of their essays on hebephrenia, catatonia, and cyclic insanity. Kahlbaum, Hecker, and Kraepelin shared both a commitment to a clinical research agenda for psychiatry (to utilize methods of clinical assessment and follow-up to help define disease forms) and a skepticism for the brain-based neuropathological paradigm of psychiatric research then dominant in most European centers. Understanding the historical origins of our key diagnostic concepts can help us to evaluate their strengths and limitations. It remains to be determined whether this "Kahlbaum-Hecker-Kraepelin paradigm"-defining disorders based on distinctive symptoms and course-will produce psychiatric syndromes of sufficient homogeneity to yield their etiologic secrets.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Schizophrenia Bulletin
                Oxford University Press (OUP)
                0586-7614
                1745-1701
                November 19 2017
                November 19 2017
                Article
                10.1093/schbul/sbx147
                6403057
                29165678
                f8fb052a-2cc1-4405-8bd8-c630f37aba01
                © 2017
                History

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