THE SOCIAL AND COGNITIVE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL DECISION-MAKING

Subjects read information about a defendant in a criminal trial with initial instructions to judge either his guilt (guilt judgment objective) or his aggressiveness (trait judgment objective). The defendant was either Hispanic or ethnically nondescript. After considering the evidence, subjects made both guilt and aggressiveness judgments (regardless of which type of judgment they were instructed to make at the time they read the information) and then recalled as much of the information they read as they could. Results favored the hypothesis that when subjects face a complex judgmental situation, they use stereotypes (when available and relevant) as a way of simplifying the judgment. Specifically, they use the stereotype as a central theme around which they organize presented evidence that is consistent with it, and they neglect inconsistent information. Subjects with a (complex) guilt judgment objective judged the defendant to be relatively more guilty and aggressive and recalled more negative information about him if he was Hispanic than if he was ethnically nondescript. In contrast, subjects with a (simple) trait judgment objective did not perceive either the guilt or aggressiveness of the two defendants to be appreciably different, and did not display any significant bias in their recall of the evidence. These and other results are discussed in terms of the information-processing strategies subjects are likely to use when they expect to make different types of judgments.

Two information-processing mechanisms that could potentially contribute to judgmental discrimination against the members of stereotyped social groups were examined in two experiments, using a mock juror decision-making task. Both postulated mechanisms involve biased processing of judgment-relevant evidence. The interpretation hypothesis asserts that the activation of stereotypic concepts influences the perceived probative implications of other evidence. The selective processing hypothesis asserts that stereotype-consistent evidence is processed more extensively than is inconsistent evidence. Judgment and memory data from the first experiment supported the general notion that stereotype-based discrimination emerges from biased evidence processing. The specific pattern of results supported selective processing rather than interpretation biases as the critical process underlying observed judgmental discrimination. The second experiment corroborated this conclusion by showing that a manipulation that prevents selective processing of the evidence effectively eliminated biases in judgments and recall pertaining to stereotyped targets. Implications for a general understanding of stereotyping and discrimination are discussed.