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      The consciousness state space (CSS)—a unifying model for consciousness and self

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          Abstract

          Every experience, those we are aware of and those we are not, is embedded in a subjective timeline, is tinged with emotion, and inevitably evokes a certain sense of self. Here, we present a phenomenological model for consciousness and selfhood which relates time, awareness, and emotion within one framework. The consciousness state space (CSS) model is a theoretical one. It relies on a broad range of literature, hence has high explanatory and integrative strength, and helps in visualizing the relationship between different aspects of experience. Briefly, it is suggested that all phenomenological states fall into two categories of consciousness, core and extended (CC and EC, respectively). CC supports minimal selfhood that is short of temporal extension, its scope being the here and now. EC supports narrative selfhood, which involves personal identity and continuity across time, as well as memory, imagination and conceptual thought. The CSS is a phenomenological space, created by three dimensions: time, awareness and emotion. Each of the three dimensions is shown to have a dual phenomenological composition, falling within CC and EC. The neural spaces supporting each of these dimensions, as well as CC and EC, are laid out based on the neuroscientific literature. The CSS dynamics include two simultaneous trajectories, one in CC and one in EC, typically antagonistic in normal experiences. However, this characteristic behavior is altered in states in which a person experiences an altered sense of self. Two examples are laid out, flow and meditation. The CSS model creates a broad theoretical framework with explanatory and unificatory power. It constructs a detailed map of the consciousness and selfhood phenomenology, which offers constraints for the science of consciousness. We conclude by outlining several testable predictions raised by the CSS model.

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          Interoception: the sense of the physiological condition of the body.

          Converging evidence indicates that primates have a distinct cortical image of homeostatic afferent activity that reflects all aspects of the physiological condition of all tissues of the body. This interoceptive system, associated with autonomic motor control, is distinct from the exteroceptive system (cutaneous mechanoreception and proprioception) that guides somatic motor activity. The primary interoceptive representation in the dorsal posterior insula engenders distinct highly resolved feelings from the body that include pain, temperature, itch, sensual touch, muscular and visceral sensations, vasomotor activity, hunger, thirst, and 'air hunger'. In humans, a meta-representation of the primary interoceptive activity is engendered in the right anterior insula, which seems to provide the basis for the subjective image of the material self as a feeling (sentient) entity, that is, emotional awareness.
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            Memory and consciousness.

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              The brain basis of emotion: a meta-analytic review.

              Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.
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                Author and article information

                Contributors
                Journal
                Front Psychol
                Front Psychol
                Front. Psychol.
                Frontiers in Psychology
                Frontiers Media S.A.
                1664-1078
                29 April 2014
                2014
                : 5
                : 341
                Affiliations
                [1] 1Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science Rehovot, Israel
                [2] 2Department of Criminology, Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel
                [3] 3The Leslie and Susan Gonda (Goldschmied) Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University Ramat Gan, Israel
                Author notes

                Edited by: James M. Broadway, University of California Santa Barbara, USA

                Reviewed by: Yuka Sasaki, Brown University, USA; James M. Broadway, University of California Santa Barbara, USA; Diego J. Cosmelli, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Chile; Claire Zedelius, University of California Santa Barbara, USA

                *Correspondence: Aviva Berkovich-Ohana, Department of Neurobiology, Weizmann Institute of Science, 234 Herzl St., Rehovot 76100,Israel e-mail: aviva.berkovich-ohana@ 123456weizmann.ac.il

                This article was submitted to Perception Science, a section of the journal Frontiers in Psychology.

                Article
                10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00341
                4010789
                24808870
                8affa8c4-e152-4a0d-aafc-122b75dd033a
                Copyright © 2014 Berkovich-Ohana and Glicksohn.

                This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (CC BY). The use, distribution or reproduction in other forums is permitted, provided the original author(s) or licensor are credited and that the original publication in this journal is cited, in accordance with accepted academic practice. No use, distribution or reproduction is permitted which does not comply with these terms.

                History
                : 20 November 2013
                : 01 April 2014
                Page count
                Figures: 4, Tables: 1, Equations: 0, References: 220, Pages: 19, Words: 17649
                Categories
                Psychology
                Hypothesis and Theory Article

                Clinical Psychology & Psychiatry
                consciousness,time,awareness,emotion,self,default mode network,flow experience,meditation

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