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      Vicarious Reinforcement in Rhesus Macaques ( Macaca Mulatta)

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          Abstract

          What happens to others profoundly influences our own behavior. Such other-regarding outcomes can drive observational learning, as well as motivate cooperation, charity, empathy, and even spite. Vicarious reinforcement may serve as one of the critical mechanisms mediating the influence of other-regarding outcomes on behavior and decision-making in groups. Here we show that rhesus macaques spontaneously derive vicarious reinforcement from observing rewards given to another monkey, and that this reinforcement can motivate them to subsequently deliver or withhold rewards from the other animal. We exploited Pavlovian and instrumental conditioning to associate rewards to self (M1) and/or rewards to another monkey (M2) with visual cues. M1s made more errors in the instrumental trials when cues predicted reward to M2 compared to when cues predicted reward to M1, but made even more errors when cues predicted reward to no one. In subsequent preference tests between pairs of conditioned cues, M1s preferred cues paired with reward to M2 over cues paired with reward to no one. By contrast, M1s preferred cues paired with reward to self over cues paired with reward to both monkeys simultaneously. Rates of attention to M2 strongly predicted the strength and valence of vicarious reinforcement. These patterns of behavior, which were absent in non-social control trials, are consistent with vicarious reinforcement based upon sensitivity to observed, or counterfactual, outcomes with respect to another individual. Vicarious reward may play a critical role in shaping cooperation and competition, as well as motivating observational learning and group coordination in rhesus macaques, much as it does in humans. We propose that vicarious reinforcement signals mediate these behaviors via homologous neural circuits involved in reinforcement learning and decision-making.

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          Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? 30 years later.

          On the 30th anniversary of Premack and Woodruff's seminal paper asking whether chimpanzees have a theory of mind, we review recent evidence that suggests in many respects they do, whereas in other respects they might not. Specifically, there is solid evidence from several different experimental paradigms that chimpanzees understand the goals and intentions of others, as well as the perception and knowledge of others. Nevertheless, despite several seemingly valid attempts, there is currently no evidence that chimpanzees understand false beliefs. Our conclusion for the moment is, thus, that chimpanzees understand others in terms of a perception-goal psychology, as opposed to a full-fledged, human-like belief-desire psychology.
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            Social neuroeconomics: the neural circuitry of social preferences.

            Combining the methods of neuroscience and economics generates powerful tools for studying the brain processes behind human social interaction. We argue that hedonic interpretations of theories of social preferences provide a useful framework that generates interesting predictions and helps interpret brain activations involved in altruistic, fair and trusting behaviors. These behaviors are consistently associated with activation in reward-related brain areas, such as the striatum, and with prefrontal activity implicated in cognitive control, the processing of emotions, and integration of benefits and costs, consistent with resolution of a conflict between self-interest and other-regarding motives.
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              The functional theory of counterfactual thinking.

              Counterfactuals are thoughts about alternatives to past events, that is, thoughts of what might have been. This article provides an updated account of the functional theory of counterfactual thinking, suggesting that such thoughts are best explained in terms of their role in behavior regulation and performance improvement. The article reviews a wide range of cognitive experiments indicating that counterfactual thoughts may influence behavior by either of two routes: a content-specific pathway (which involves specific informational effects on behavioral intentions, which then influence behavior) and a content-neutral pathway (which involves indirect effects via affect, mind-sets, or motivation). The functional theory is particularly useful in organizing recent findings regarding counterfactual thinking and mental health. The article concludes by considering the connections to other theoretical conceptions, especially recent advances in goal cognition.
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                Author and article information

                Journal
                Front Neurosci
                Front. Neurosci.
                Frontiers in Neuroscience
                Frontiers Research Foundation
                1662-4548
                1662-453X
                03 March 2011
                2011
                : 5
                : 27
                Affiliations
                [1] 1simpleCenter for Cognitive Neuroscience, Duke University Durham, NC, USA
                [2] 2simpleDepartment of Neurobiology, Duke University Durham, NC, USA
                [3] 3simpleDepartment of Evolutionary Anthropology, Duke University Durham, NC, USA
                [4] 4simpleDepartment of Psychology and Neuroscience, Duke University Durham, NC, USA
                Author notes

                Edited by: Daeyeol Lee, Yale University School of Medicine, USA

                Reviewed by: Mehrdad Jazayeri, University of Washington, USA; James Rilling, Emory University, USA

                *Correspondence: Steve W. C. Chang, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, B203 Levine Science Research Center, Duke University, Box 90999, Durham, NC 27708, USA.e-mail: steve.chang@ 123456duke.edu

                This article was submitted to Frontiers in Decision Neuroscience, a specialty of Frontiers in Neuroscience.

                Article
                10.3389/fnins.2011.00027
                3080185
                21516263
                925e43a0-b2d0-4cbc-a808-a5a1018bb2d0
                Copyright © 2011 Chang, Winecoff and Platt.

                This is an open-access article subject to an exclusive license agreement between the authors and Frontiers Media SA, which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited

                History
                : 05 January 2011
                : 20 February 2011
                Page count
                Figures: 5, Tables: 1, Equations: 1, References: 49, Pages: 10, Words: 7903
                Categories
                Neuroscience
                Original Research

                Neurosciences
                vicarious reinforcement,social interaction,gaze,rhesus macaques,social reward
                Neurosciences
                vicarious reinforcement, social interaction, gaze, rhesus macaques, social reward

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