Humans and other animals often violate economic principles when choosing between multiple alternatives, but the underlying neurocognitive mechanisms remain elusive. A robust finding is that adding a third option can alter the relative preference for the original alternatives, but studies disagree on whether the third option’s value decreases or increases accuracy. To shed light on this controversy, we used and extended the paradigm of one study reporting a positive effect. However, our four experiments with 147 human participants and a reanalysis of the original data revealed that the positive effect is neither replicable nor reproducible. In contrast, our behavioral and eye-tracking results are best explained by assuming that the third option’s value captures attention and thereby impedes accuracy. We propose a computational model that accounts for the complex interplay of value, attention, and choice. Our theory explains how choice sets and environments influence the neurocognitive processes of multi-alternative decision making.
A man in a restaurant is offered a choice between apple or blueberry pie, and chooses apple. The waiter then returns a few moments later and tells him they also have cherry pie available. “In that case”, replies the man, “I’ll have blueberry”.
This well-known anecdote illustrates a principle in economics and psychology called the independence principle. This states that preferences between two options should not change when a third option becomes available. A person who prefers apple over blueberry pie should continue to do so regardless of whether cherry pie is also on the menu. But, as in the anecdote, people often violate the independence principle when making decisions. One example is voting. People may vote for a candidate who would not usually be their first choice only because there is also a similar but clearly less preferable candidate available.
Such behavior provides clues to the mechanisms behind making decisions. Studies show, for example, that when people have to choose between two options, introducing a desirable third option that cannot be selected – a distractor – alters what decision they make. But the studies disagree on whether the distractor improves or impairs performance.
Gluth et al. now resolve this controversy using tasks in which people had to choose between rectangles on a computer screen for the chance to win different amounts of money. Contrary to a previous study, their four experiments showed that a high-value distractor did not change how likely the volunteers were to select one of the two available options over the other. Instead, the distractor slowed down the entire decision-making process. Moreover, volunteers often selected the high-value distractor despite knowing that they could not have it. One explanation for such behavior is that high-value items capture our attention automatically even when they are irrelevant to our goals. If a person likes chocolate cake, their attention will immediately be drawn to a cake in a shop window, even if they had no plans to buy a cake. Eye-tracking data confirmed that volunteers in the above experiments spent more time looking at high-value items than low-value ones. Those volunteers whose gaze was distracted the most by high-value items also made the worst decisions.
Based on the new data, Gluth et al. developed and tested a mathematical model. The model describes how we make decisions, and how attention influences this process. It provides insights into the interplay between attention, valuation and choice – particularly when we make decisions under time pressure. Such insights may enable us to improve decision-making environments where people must choose quickly between many options. These include emergency medicine, road traffic situations, and the stock market. To achieve this goal, findings from the current study need to be tested under more naturalistic conditions.